Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

2001

Failing the Test: Germany Leads Europe in
Dismantling Refugee Protection
Maryellen Fullerton
Brooklyn Law School, maryellen.fullerton@brooklaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
36 Tex. Int'l L. J. 231 (2001)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

Failing the Test: Germany Leads Europe in
Dismantling Refugee Protection
MARYELLEN FULLERTONt

"It was in Europe that the institution ofrefugee protectionwas born,
andit is in Europe today that the adequacy of that system is being
tested."
i
Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
SUMMARY

I.

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................
232

11. BACKGROUND ......................................................................
235

1II.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS ..............................................
237

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEwoRK IN GERMANY ...............................................
239

RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO THE TERRITORY ...............................................
240

V.

A.
B.
VI.

Visa Policies.............................................................
240
CarrierSanctions..........................................................
241

RESTRICTION TO ACCESS TO THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE .....................................
242

A.

Safe Third County Principle..................................................
243
1. Decision-making at the Borders ..............................................
245
2. Expanded Border Zone ...................................................
246
3. Safety in Third Countries ..................................................
246
B. ReadmissionAgreements .....................................................
250
VII. MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED APPLICATIONS AND ACCELERATED PROCEDURES ...........
253

A. Manifestly UnfoundedApplications..............................................
253
B. AcceleratedAirportProcedure.................................................
255

VIII. THE REGULAR ASYLUM PROCEDURE .................................................
259
A. The FederalRefugee Office Hearing.............................................
259
1. Insufficient Preparation Time ...............................................
259
2. Inadequate Interpreters ....................................................
260
3. Insensitivity to Female Asylum-seekers .........................................
261
B. JudicialReview ...........................................................
263

t Professor of Law,Brooklyn Law School The author wishes to thank Brooklyn Law School for the giant
that supported this research.
1. Madame Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissoner, 1991-2000, Statement Marking the
Publication in German of UNITED NATIONS HIGH Co MItssIO\T:R FOR REGUEES, TIIE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES: IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS (1995), Bonn (June 1994), Refivorld CD-ROM.

232

IX .

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36:231

CRIERiA FOR ASYLUM ............................................................
264
A. ConstitutionalGuaranteeofAsylum ................................................
264
1. State-sponsored Persecution ...................................................
264
2. Internal Flight Alternative ....................................................
266
B. Statutory ProtectionAgainst Persecution.............................................
266
1. "Lesser" Asylum ..........................................................
266

2. Prohibition Against Deportation ............................................
267
3. Rejected Asylum-seekers Who Cannot Be Deported ................................
268
4.

The Duldung Dilemma ......................................................
269

X.

DETENTION ....................................................................
270
A. DetentionPendingDeportation....................................................
270
B. Detentionat the Airport.........................................................
273

XI.

CONCLUSION ...................................................................
274
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1993 Germany's constitutional guarantee was elegant in its simplicity:
"Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum." 2 The difficulty
that refugees from the Nazi regime had in obtaining asylum elsewhere was a fresh memory
when Germany's postwar constitution opened German borders to those persecuted around
the world. Adopted in the shadow of the death camps, this provision of the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany protected refugees who entered Germany for close to half
a century. Pursuant to this constitution, more than a million refugees sought asylum in
Germany, a land from which so many fled in the 1930s and 1940s.
The postwar era of refugee protection ended in Germany in July 1993, in large part,
because the rest of Europe-particularly the European Union (EU) countries-failed to act.
The EU watched the atmosphere of crisis grow as more than two million refugees and
asylum-seekers sought protection in Europe during the prior decade. The EU failed to
mount any joint efforts to assist member states in coping with asylum-seekers. The fifteen
countries of the European Union were content to let one country shoulder the lion's share of

the burden.

3

Germany, by itself, had been receiving fifty percent of the applicants for asylum in
Europe and the proportion seemed to be growing. 4 In response, Germany developed an
elaborate social structure to house and feed asylum-seekers and a voluminous and
sophisticated jurisprudence concerning asylum. Developments in Germany were monitored
2.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 16(2) (F.R.G.).

3. From 1985 through 1999, Western European countries recorded the arrival of 5,000,000 asylum-seekers,
See Nicholas Van Hear & Jeff Crisp, Refugee Protection and Immigration Control: Addressing the Asylum
Dilemma, 17 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1,2 (1998).
4. Asylum-seekers arriving in Germany from 1985 through 2000 totaled 2,413,406, while the total in
Western Europe was 5,535,839. Comparing the totals for several specific years provides a sense of the magnitude
of the asylum process. In 1985, the number of new asylum-seekers reported by western European countries was
165,000, of which Germany received almost 74,000. In 1990, new asylum-seekers in Europe totaled 435,000, of
which Germany received 193,000. In 1992, the new asylum in Europe reached 676,000, of which Germany
received 438,000. In 1995, the number of new asylum-seekers in Europe and Germany, respectively, totaled
approximately 290,000 and 130,000. Bundesamt fMr die Anerkennung Auslandiseher Flachtlinge, Statistiken,
[Federal
Office
for
the
Recognition
of
Foreign
Refugees,
Statistics],
available at

http://www.BAFI.de/bafl/templatetindexstatistiken.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) [hereinater Federal Refugee
Office Statistics]. For statistics for Western Europe between 1985 and 1991, see Pro Asyl, Asylum-seekers in
Europe (June 19, 1996) (unpublished report, on file with the Texas International Law Journal).
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in other European capitals, but EU assistance to Germany was not forthcoming. As the

country with the most at stake, Germany decided in 1993 to act unilaterally to halt the flow
of refugees and asylum-seekers.
This action by Germany, the bellwether of refugee law and policy in Europe in the last
decades of the twentieth century, bodes ill for the institution of asylum throughout Europe.

Many of the EU countries are watching Germany's new laws to see which restrictive
measures prove effective and can be adapted for use back home. For example, the United
Kingdom enacted a new asylum law in early 2000 that patterns social benefits for asylum-

seekers on restrictive measures adopted earlier by Germany, 5 and is currently adopting the
German policy of refusing to consider claims submitted by asylum-seekers who crossed

other EU countries before they submitted their asylum applications.6 In the Netherlands,
pending legislation would add to the refugee procedure the German rule that rejects asylum
claims from nationals of countries that have ratified the international refugee convention!
Other European countries, mainly to the east, are watching Germany's new laws to see how
many asylum-seekers they shift to neighboring countries with less developed infrastructures
and legal systems. 8 Indeed, Ukraine is considering amending its refugee law in 2001 to add
the "safe third country" concept so crucial to Germany's post-1993 approach. 9 The Czech
Republic has already done so.10 It is a safe prediction that major portions of Germany's

restrictive asylum practices will be replicated in other European states.
Government officials, advocates, and scholars have long recognized the important role
Germany played in late twentieth century asylum law and policy, but there has been
relatively little scholarly analysis of German legal developments in English." Having

focused on refugee developments in Germany over the past fifteen years,

2

my interest

intensified in the 1990s as I observed the momentous legal changes to the German asylum
system. My field work in Germany before and after unification gave me a greater
comprehension of the profound changes taking place in German society in recent years. 3

As I monitored the constitutional amendment in 1993 and the subsequent legislation, I saw
clearly that the asylum law had been fundamentally rewritten. How the new provisions,

Al.

5.

See Sarah Lyall, BritainRaises BarriersHigh Against the Asylum Scekers, N.Y. TImES, Apr. 3, 2000, at

6.

See Andrea Gerlin, British Official Seeks Revised. dslum Pact, PHILADELPHIA LNQUIRER, Feb. 7,2001.

7. New Aleins Bill Receives FinalApproval by the Senate MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Dec. 2000, at 16.
8. See Steven Erlanger, On New Europe's Rim, FamiliesFearRamparts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at A3.
9. Lmv of Ukraine "On Refugees", 16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE V ERIHOVNA RADA OF UKRAIE 90 (1994) (on
file with the Texas International Law Journal).
10. Zakon 325/1999 Sb. (On Asylum), §§ 2(2), 16(l)(e) (Czech. Rep.).

11. There is an extensive literature in German, of course, and there are insightful articles in English. See,
e.g., 2 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND FOREIGN POLICY: U.S. AND GERMAN POLICIES TOWARD COUNTRIES OF OUG,
(Rainer Manz & Myron Weiner eds., 1997); Ryszard Piotrowiez, Facing Up to Refugees InternationalApathy
andGerman Self Help, 10 INT'LJ. OF REFUGEE L 410 (1998).
12. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GERMANY FOR GERMAnS: XENOPIIO3IA AND RACIST VIOLECE V4
GERMiANY (1995); Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Rfagce Status Based on Pcrscettion Due to
Membership in a ParticularSocial Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 506 (1993); Maryellen Fullerton, Persecution
Due to Membership in a ParticularSocial Group: Jurisprudencein the FederalRepublic of Germany, 4 GEo.
IM,9GR. LJ. 381 (1990); Maryellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow ofAsylum-Seekers in Belgium, Dcnmark. the
FederalRepublic of German, and the Netherlands:New Challengesto the Geneva Convcntion Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights, 39 VA. J. L'rL L 35 (1998) [hereinafter
Fullerton, Restrictingthe Flow].
13. I spent the 1986-1987 academic year on a Fulbright Research Fellowship studying comparative asylum
policy in the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium. I spent the 1994-1995 academic year on a German
Marshall Fund Fellowship studying the impact of German asylum policy on neighboring countries. In addition, I
have made multiple research trips to Germany before and after the fellowships.
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such as the safe third country principle, the accelerated hearings, and the limitations on the
right to appeal, actually affected those on the ground was less clear.
To understand the significance of the legal changes, I went back to Germany to
investigate events in the field. I wanted to identify concretely the full impact of the legal
measures. I traveled to many cities and states in Germany, both in the east and in the west,
talking to asylum-seekers and-whenever possible-visiting them where they live. I spoke
to government officials, refugee advocates, religious leaders, judges, and private attorneys,
I met with members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working at the local,
national, and international levels. I visited holding areas at airports, asylun hostels in cities,
reception centers in the countryside, asylum accommodations aboard ships, detention
facilities in prisons, and many offices and private homes.
What I found is deeply disturbing. Acting under the rubric of burden-sharing and
self-help,14 Germany stanched the flow of asylum-seekers, but it has done so at the price of
violating international human rights norms and refugee law principles. The new German
laws restrict access to German territory; they restrict access to the asylum procedure; they
restrict the criteria for asylum; they restrict the right to appeal. Although Germany did not
invent each of these restrictive mechanisms, Germany is the country that linked them
together in the most comprehensive fashion.
My investigation concluded that many of these legal provisions sound rational and
even-measured on their own. When voiced by government officials removed from the
plight of the individual asylum-seekers uprooted from their homes, the provisions seem
sensible. They appear to protect the German asylum system by shifting asylum-seekers to
countries they entered before they arrived in Germany and by weeding out those asylumseekers with bogus claims. However, vhen observed in combination with each other, and
from the perspective of those seeking protection, it is clear that the new legal provisions
have created an almost impenetrable asylum system that denies relief to many who need it,
My field work convinced me that the human costs of these new measures are great.
They include a rise in clandestine migration, a rise in the number of asylum-seekers turned
away without any examination of their claims, and a rise in those denied asylum even
though asylum officers believe their claims of persecution.
The legal costs of the new German measures are also great. This article will examine
how the German asylum system, as applied, violates the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Turning away large numbers of asylum-seekers and directing them to
less-secure states is a fundamental violation of the 1951 Convention. Germany and other
states that ratified the 1951 Convention promised not to send refugees back to places where
they will face persecution.
Based on my field work, this article will also show how the restrictive asylum system
in Germany violates the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. State parties to this convention agree not to subject anyone to inhuman or
degrading treatment or torture, and have applied this prohibition to deportation orders that
send asylum-seekers back to danger.
Calling on evidence gathered as I witnessed asylum hearings and discussed them with
participants, this article demonstrates further how recurrent problems with foreign languages
and with gender bias call into question the integrity of the asylum procedure and the
reliability of the asylum decisions. My investigation into the growing practice of detaining
asylum-seekers in Germany also highlights the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its requirements concerning detention.
14. For an analysis of self-help justifications for restrictions on asylum-seekers, see generally Piotrowic,
supra note 11.
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The information I gathered leads me to conclude that current German practice violates

multiple international legal norms. My research regarding the pertinent legal instruments
and my research in the field lead to the conclusion that the new German approach to asylum
poses a thoroughgoing and fundamental threat to the institution of refugee protection. It
exacts great human and legal costs. It affects an entire region. If other EU countries follow
the German example, Europe will fail the test regarding the system of refugee protection
that, as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees pointed out, is currently underway.

IH. BACKGROUND
This story of substantial refugee flows to post-World War II Europe begins in the
1980s, when asylum-seekers began to come in steady numbers from countries in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. Earlier decades witnessed refugee movements in Europe, of
course, in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, the 1968 Prague Spring uprising, and the
1975 denouement of the Vietnam War.15 The first three decades following World War II
saw relatively few spontaneous refugees, although
resettlement programs organized the
6
movement of many of these individuals to Europe.'
This changed dramatically in the 1980s as air travel increased accessibility around the
globe and other transcontinental travel networks developed. The Cold War had a significant
impact, as proxy wars between client states in Africa and Asia created turmoil and

displacement in many regions. Close to home, a last gasp of Iron Curtain politics in the
mid-1980s delivered many asylum-seekers to the heart of western Europe. The German
Democratic Republic issued transit visas to all those who could pay the state-owned airline
in hard currency and then
pointed the way to Checkpoint Charlie where asylum-seekers
17
could enter West Berlin.
The post-war economic boom had slowed, leaving EU countries-including
Germany-coping with stagnant economies. As unemployment persisted in the 1980s,
Germany and other EU countries enacted legislation to discourage asylum-seekers.18 If
these measures were
successful, it was difficult to discern. The numbers of asylum-seekers
t9
continued to rise.

The demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the
communist governments that ruled Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union triggered fear in
EU countries of a gigantic flood of asylum-seekers from the east. This fear did not
materialize, but large numbers of refugees did arrive from many parts of the globe. New
waves arrived in the early 1990s, mainly from the south. War broke out in the former
Yugoslavia; ethnic cleansing and mortar fire sent hundreds of thousands of refugees on the
road.

15.

Other refugees, such as Chileans fleeing after Pinochet's coup against Allende, also arrived in the 1970s,

but there were far fewer spontaneous refugees Who entered Europe then. Sec Van Hear & Crisp, supra note 3, at

3.
16. See id.
17. This was possible because the Federal Republic of Germany viewed all of Berlin as one German
municipality and did not require passports for entry from other sectors of the city. For a discussion of the Berlin
Gap, see Fullerton, Restricting the Flow, supra note 12, at 67-69.

18. For a discussion of restrictive legal measures undertaken in the 1980s in Europe, sea generally It
19.

There was a decline in asylum applications from 1986 (195,000 in Europe; 100,000 in Germany) to

1987 (172,000 in Europe; 57,000 in Germany), but the numbers then rose steadily in 1988 (220,000 in Europe;
103,000 in Germany), 1989 (313,000 in Europe; 121,000 in Germany) and afterward. Pro Asyl, supra note 4.
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Germany experienced exponential increases in the numbers of asylum-seekers. There

were 121,000 new arrivals in 1989; 193,000 in 1990; and 256,000 in 1991.20 In 1992, more
than 438,000 new asylum-seekers entered Germany, constituting over sixty percent of the
asylum applications filed in the EU. 2 '

Throughout these years, Germany, with more than half of the refugees and asylumseekers in the EU, enthusiastically embraced multilateral efforts to regulate migration and

22
asylum. Germany was a founding member of the Schengen group, a small contingent of

EU countries that agreed in 1985 to begin abolition of passport controls at their common
23
borders. Germany ratified the Dublin Convention, an effort by EU states to develop
standards for determining which state is responsible for deciding asylum applications when

asylum-seekers have connections to more than one state. Germany was an insistent voice
for joint EU action concerning asylum-seekers and war refugees.

The EU turned a deaf ear to Germany's exhortations. While professing the desirability
of joint action and the equity of a more even distribution of asylum-seekers, the EU
temporized.

There were endless studies and multiple working groups.

Responsibility

the draft stage. 24
sharing was debated, but burden-sharing proposals never moved beyond
25
In the early 1990s, close to 600,000 Bosnians fled to EU countries. Sixty percentover 340,000-went to Germany. 26

German society was severely taxed, fiscally and

psychologically, by the unification process that began in 1990. In addition, Germany
already sheltered over 200,000 others who had been granted refugee status, 130,000 family
27
members of refugees, 650,000 de facto refugees, and 285,000 asylum-seekers. Desperate

for a more even distribution of the asylum-seekers and war refugees in Europe, Germany

consulted with sister EU states. There were EU resolutions calling on member states to
persons 28 and proposals for joint action30 to offer
share the burden of sheltering displaced
29
in the end, these were only exhortatory.
but
refugees,
war
to
temporary protection

20. Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
21. Id.
22. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders and the Convention
Applying the Agreement, done June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68, 69, 73, 84 [in four parts] [hereinafter Schengen
Convention]. The Schengen Agreement concluded June 14, 1985; Schengen Convention concluded June 19,
1990. Additional EU states have since joined the five original members of the Schengen group. See Jay Niessen,
The European Union's Migration and Asylum Policies, Introduction to ELSPETH GUILD, THE DEVELOPING
IIMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3,27 (1996).
23. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One
of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 425 [hereinafter Dublin
Convention].
24. For a discussion of the painfully slow EU reaction during the past eight years, which still has not
culminated in a joint plan for temporarily displaced persons, see generally Karoline Kerber, Temporary Protection
in the European Union: A Chronology, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 35 (1999).
25. Khalid Koser et al., Temporary Protection and the Assisted Return of Refugees from the European
Union, 10 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L 444,446 (1998).
26. Id.
27. Office of the United Nationals High Commissioner for Refugees, Populations of Concern to UNHCR: A
Statistical Overview (1995), available at http.//www.unhcr.chlrefworldlrefbib/refstat/1995/95introhtm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001).
28. See Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on Burden Sharing with Regard to the Admission and
Residence of Displaced Persons on a Temporary Basis, 1995 O.J. (C 262) 1.
29. See Proposal to the Council for Joint Action Based on Article K 3(2)(b) of the Treaty on European Union
Concerning Temporary Protection of Displaced Persons, 1997 O.J. (C 106) 13.
30. Even today, with television images of a massive exodus of Kosovar Albanians still fresh in European
news, the EU response lacks any sense of urgency. Meeting in Tampere, Finland in October 1999, EU leaders
consigned asylum and migration issues to an agenda item for a meeting in December 2001, more than two years in
the future, and ordered working groups to undertake further study of the topics. See Antonio Cruz, Tampere
Summit: Flimsy Results DisappointGreatExpectations,MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Nov. 1999, at 1.
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Finally, Germany acted on its own. In 1993, Germany amended its constitution and
passed restrictive asylum legislation. It excluded asylum-seekers who had crossed safe third
countries from eligibility for asylum. It truncated asylum proceedings in a wide variety of
circumstances. It limited judicial review. In taking these steps, Germany hoped to protect
its own borders from future asylum-seekers and to force some of the neighboring states to
shoulder more responsibility for refugees in Europe. It hoped to reduce the time and effort
spent on asylum applications filed in Germany.
The results of Germany's self-help have been stark. From more than 435,000 asylumseekers in 1992, the asylum applications fell to 127,000 in 1994.1 By 2000, the number of
new asylum-seekers had fallen to 78,500.32 During these years the percentage of asylumseekers recognized as refugees plummeted. The Federal Refugee Office3 3 recognized 7.3%
of the asylum-seekers as refugees in 1994.34 By 1997, the recognition rate decreased to
4.9%.35 In 1998, it fell further 37to 3.9%.36 It has continued its downward trend, dropping to
3% in 1999, and 2.9% in 2000.
The numbers vividly portray how drastic the changes have been in Germany. What
they do not signal are the unmeasurable costs. Thousands of asylum-seekers have been
turned away by Germany to an uncertain fate elsewhere. Thousands more have now become
clandestine immigrants in Germany. Additional thousands exist above ground in a legal
limbo, neither regularized in status nor deported. The vulnerability of the those without
legal status needs no emphasis. The human toll on those who face a continuing uncertain
future is more hidden.

Other westem European countries face similar pressures from asylum-seekers.
Although their asylum system statistics may be lower than those in Germany, many EU
states also perceive themselves as magnets for asylum-seekers and for economic migrants,
both of whom they fear. They are watching Germany's efforts to shift the refugee
protection burden elsewhere. If Germany, with its elaborate asylum social structure and its
multilayered asylum jurisprudence, can achieve this goal, other EU states will be eager to
adopt the restrictions pioneered in Germany. Whether Germany and other EU states can
change their treatment of asylum-seekers and simultaneously comply with international law
is another story.
H1.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS

When the High Commissioner for Refugees spoke about the birth of the institution of
refugee protection in Europe, she was referring to the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 38 Adopted in Geneva in the aftermath of World War II, the 1951

31.
32.
33.

Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
Id.
The Federal Refugee Office (Bundesamt.firdie Anerkennung ausldndisclerFkhtlinge)is the national

government agency charged with deciding asylum claims. See infratext accompanying notes 132-134, 153-164.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Federal Refugee Office Statistics,supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.

38. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]. Germany signed the Convention on

Nov. 19, 1951 and ratified it on Dec. 1, 1953. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor
signatureJuly 18, 1951, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, U.N. Doz. STILECISER.E16,
at 181 (1987). The 1967 Protocol expanded the Convention to apply to persons who became refugees due to
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Refugee Convention is the most widely adopted legal instrument regarding refugees. More
than 135 states are parties,39 and there is such widespread consensus concerning some of the
convention's terms that they have developed into customary international law.40 The 1951
Refugee Convention adopts a generous and inclusive refugee definition:
[A refugee is] any person who... owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and
is unable or,41owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country.
Much of the Convention focuses on the rights that states must provide to those
recognized as refugees, but does not impose duties concerning asylum-seekers. 42 The most
crucial provision of the Convention applies to both, although its express language refers to
refugees: "No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of3his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'A
There is no derogation from this non-refoulement provision. It is the centerpiece of
the Refugee Convention-states that become parties do not commit themselves to providing
asylum or permanent residence to refugees, 44 but they expressly agree that they will not
return a refugee to persecution. This obligation applies to all refugees, not just to those
provided permanent residence. Accordingly, states may not turn away asylum-seekers at
their borders without running afoul of the non-refoulement provision because some of those
asylum-seekers may satisfy the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of refugee. In effect,
states must treat all asylum-seekers as presumptive refugees until there has been a
determination that they are not.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms4 5 also imposes obligations on states in dealings with asylum-seekers and refugees.
The Convention states: "No
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
'6
treatment or punishment.'
The European Court of Human Rights has forcefully applied this convention to state47
action that returns those seeking protection to situations that threaten their life and safety.
events that occurred after 1951. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
39. See InternationalInstruments, 18 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 208 (1999).
40. See generally Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J.INT'L L.
897 (1986); Robert C. Sexton, PoliticalRefugees, Non-refoulement andState Practice:A ComparativeSltudy, 18
VAND. J. TRANSNT'L. L 731 (1985). But see Kay Hailbronner, Non-refoulement and HumanitarianRefugees:
CustomaryInternationalLav or Wishfid Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J.INT'L. L 857 (1986).
41. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art. 1(A)(2).
42. 1 use the term "refugee" in this article to denote those who satisfy the 1951 Refugee Convention

definition and the term "asylum-seeker" to denote all those who request protection from persecution or similar
harm. Refugees are a subset of asylum-seekers.
43. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 38, art. 33.
44. In fact, many states have adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of refugee in their municipal
law as a basis for asylum, but this is not a Convention requirement.
45. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].
46. Id. art. 3.

47. See, e.g., Sarialtun v. Germany, App. No. 37534/97 (2000) (concerning deportation of rejected Kurdish
asylum-seeker to Turkey where he faced potential violence targeted at him would violate art. 3); Chahal v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 2241/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997) (concerning deportation of Sikh activist to India
would violate art. 3); Ahmed v. Austria, App. No. 25964/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 278 (1997) (concerning
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Germany and all the other EU states have ratified the European Human Rights Convention,
and their actions are limited by its provisions and its developing jurisprudence.45
Other sources of international law apply to reftigees and asylum-seekers. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) limits the conditions that can
be imposed on them during the examination of their claims. 49 It specifically addresses
detention, and emphasizes the fundamental distinction states must observe between the
treatment of those convicted of crimes and those detained without criminal charge or merely
accused of illegal activity: "Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be
segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to
their status as unconvicted persons." 50 The growing practice of detaining rejected asylumseekers often runs afoul of this provision.

IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK INGERRMANY
Prior to 1993, Germany saw its obligations to refugees as a function of both the
German Constitution, which guaranteed asylum to all those persecuted on political grounds,

and the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defined as refugees those who fear persecution
based on their race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion. An extensive
jurisprudence developed, exploring the differences, as well as the congruences, between
these two perspectives. Much of the German jurisprudence focused on the constitutional

provision because it was considered broader in many respects and because the German

courts were familiar with interpreting and applying the German Constitution.
The 1993 amendment to the German Constitution ostensibly preserves the institution
of asylum in Germany. It retains the prior constitutional language, which states: "Those

persecuted on political grounds have the right to asylum." 5'

The amendment then adds several provisions that sharply reduce the number of
individuals eligible to rely on this constitutional protection. First, those who pass through

safe third countries on their way to Germany may not invoke the right to asylum 5 2 Second,
those who come from safe countries of origin may not invoke the right to asylum, unless
53
they can present evidence to overcome the presumption that persecution does not exist.

deportation of Somali who had lost his refugee status to Somalia where he risked serious mistreatment %%ould
violate art. 3); AItun v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
209 (1984) (concerning deportation of student rights activist with pending asylum application to Turkey wher he
might face torture would violate art. 3); Amekrane v. United Kingdom, 1973 Y.B. Eua. Coxy. o" H.R. 356, 370-

72, 376-78, 382-88 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (conceming deportation from Gibraltar to Morocco of asylumtseeker accused of participating in failed coup d'etat in Morocco violated art. 3).

48.

Germany signed the European Human Rights Convention on Nov. 4, 1950 and ratified the Convention

on Dec. 5, 1952. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 45, at 222.
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedforsignature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
1710 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

50. Id. art. 10(2)(a).
51.

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 16(a), para. 1 (F.R.G.).

52. Id. art. 16(a), para. 2. Paragraph 1 may not be invoked by anybody vho enters the country from a
member state of the European Community or another third country where the application of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and European
Convention is assured. Countries outside the European Community which fulfill the conditions of the first
sentence of this paragraph shall be specified by legislation requiring the consent of the Bundesrat. In cases
covered by the first sentence, measures terminating a person's sojourn may be carried out irrf-spctive of any
remedy sought by that person.
53. Id. art. 16(a), para. 3. Legislation requiring the consent of the Bundesrat may be introduced to specify
countries where the legal situation, the application of the law, and the general political circumstances justify the
assumption that neither political persecution nor inhumane or degrading punishment or treatment takes place
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Third, those whose claims are deemed manifestly unfounded and those from safe countries
of origin have limited procedural rights. 4 They can challenge a negative administrative
decision in court only in extremely limited circumstances. In addition, their challenges do
not stay the execution of deportation orders, which allows the authorities to deport asylumseekers while they pursue their limited right to appeal.
These constitutional changes, when combined and added to the restrictive measures
already in place, drastically altered the asylum system in Germany. The separate provisions
of German law have been interwoven in a largely successful attempt to limit asylun-seekers
in Germany. They have begun to accomplish a primary objective, which is to prevent
asylum-seekers from reaching Germany. They have substantially accomplished an
additional objective, which is to restrict access to the German asylum procedure even for
those who manage to evade the obstacles to entry and arrive on German soil. They have
made significant progress toward a third objective, which is to reduce the substantive and
procedural rights of those who manage to find their way through the various barriers to
access and enter the asylum procedure. The criteria for refugee status are exceedingly strict.
The time deadlines are short, and the avenues for appeal are very limited.
To understand the impact these restrictions have on asylum-seekers and the ways in
which the system results in individual decisions that violate international law, this article
will examine the German legal measures in the order that most asylum-seekers face them,
V.

RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO THE TERRITORY

Not surprisingly, the first German laws that most asylum-seekers encotnter are
provisions that restrict access to Germany. Germany erected the first barrier to asylumseekers in places far from German soil. Indeed, this barrier is generally outside Europe. It
has two components-visa requirements and carrier sanctions-that combine to keep
asylum-seekers from ever reaching German territory. The restrictions on access to territory
are so effective that most asylum-seekers never get to Germany to tell their story. Although
this means that I did not meet them during my field work in Germany, a little imagination
will allow us to understand the impact of these restrictive laws on the lives of individuals
fleeing from persecution. Consider, as you read the legal provisions below, the case of
dissidents from Sierra Leone who manage to reach Senegal and to scrape together enough
money for airfare to Germany.
A.

Visa Policies

An elaborate network of visa restrictions aims to halt asylum-seekers before they even
begin their trip to Germany or to other EU countries. The Federal Republic of Germany
established visa requirements well before 1993, as did other European states. The number
of states whose nationals require a visa to enter Germany has continued to grow. Germany
now extends a visa requirement to all major refugee-producing countries.

there. A foreigner from such a country shall not be considered subject to persecution on political grounds unless
he presents facts showing that, contrary to this assumption, he is subjected to political persecution.

54. Id. art. 16(a), para. 4. The implementation of measures terminating a person's sojourn shall, in the cases
referred in paragraph 3 and in other cases that are clearly unjustified or considered to be clearly unjustified, be

suspended by the court only where serious doubt exists as to the legality of the measure; the scope of the
investigation may be restricted and objections submitted after the prescribed time limit may be disregarded.
Details shall be the subject of a law.
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In this respect, Germany and the EU are in accord. Although they have not adopted a
joint approach to dealing with asylum-seekers, the EU states have reached consensus
concerning those countries whose nationals must possess a visa in order to enter EU
territory.55 Currently, the EU has listed over 100 countries whose citizens need a visa to
cross into EU member states, and there are plans to expand the visa requirement to thirty
more countries. 5 In addition, EU member states retain the right to require visas from
nationals of countries that do not appear on the EU list.
Citizens of those countries for which either Germany or the EU has imposed a visa
requirement, such as Sierra Leone, must obtain advance permission from German consulates
or embassies abroad before they can enter Germany. This is impossible in most cases.
Fearing persecution in one's homeland is not a basis for receiving a German visa. All those
who lack visas, Sierra Leonean asylum-seekers as well as others, are legally prohibited from
entering Germany. This visa policy precludes almost all the refugees in the world from
entering Germany legally.
B.

CarrierSanctions

Enforcement of the visa requirement occurs in two stages: first, by airline employees,
then, by border guards. In 1987, Germany enacted legislation that imposes on air, sea, and
other carriers a fine of DM 2000 for each foreigner transported to Germany who lacks a
residence permit or a required visa.57 In addition, the law requires the carrier to pay all
public expenditures incurred due to the arrival of the unauthorized individuals, as well as to
3
bear the cost of transporting them away from Germany.
For asylum-seekers, the sanctions on carriers have created a practically impenetrable
barrier to reaching Germany and many other developed countries. Airline employees know
that the airline company will be subject to serious fines if it carries passengers to Germany

who lack the required travel documents. Therefore, the airline workers will protect their

employer against possible financial penalties and forbid those without visas from boarding.
Suppose the political dissidents from Sierra Leone were able to flee to Senegal and to
purchase airplane tickets from Dakar to Frankfurt. When the Sierra Leoneans appear at the

airport in Dakar and produce valid passports but cannot produce German visas, the airline
employees refuse to allow them to board the plane. Pleas of persecution suffered in Sierra
Leone, even evidence of torture such as amputated limbs, will be to no avail. At best, if the
airline employees are sympathetic to the plight of the Sierra Leoneans, they may direct them
to seek visas from the German embassy in Dakar or to seek protection in Senegal itself.
That the German consular officials would not provide visas in this situation and that Senegal

might be unable or unvilling to provide protection to Sierra Leoneans would be irrelevant to
the decisions of the airline employees.

55. See Council Regulation 574199, 1999 OJ. (L 72) 2 (determining the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States).
56. The European Commission proposed a regulation on January 25, 2000 creating two visa lists. The fist
lists countries whose nationals require entry visas to cross the external borders of the EU. The second lists
countries whose nationals can enter the EU without visas. The Commission has proposed increasing the number
of countries on the required visa list from 101 to 134. The Commission has proposed forty-nine countries for the
no-visa list. See EuropeanCommission ProposesNew Lists on Jqsas, MIGRATION NEWS StiEEL, Feb. 2000, at 2.
57. Gesetz zur nderung asylverfahrensrechticher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher tnd auslanderrechtlicher
Vorsehriften ( uslandergesetz), v. 6.1.1987 (BGB1. I S.92) [Amendment of January 6, 1987 to Laws ofAsylum,
Work Permits, and Aliens].
58. Id. § 4.
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The same scenario applies to Tamils from Sri Lanka who manage to travel to Bombay
where they can buy airplane tickets to Frankfurt and to women fleeing the Taliban in
Afghanistan who arrive in Istanbul with airfare to Germany. It applies to all asylum-seekers
from all the major refugee-producing countries. Unless the asylum-seekers obtain prior
official approval to enter Germany, as evidenced by visas issued by a German consular
officer, the airline employees prevent the asylum-seekers from boarding the plane.
During the last decade the carrier sanctions and the visa requirement have had a major
impact on asylum-seekers. In combination, they have effectively moved the border from
German soil to airports in countries far away from Germany. 9 Airline employees, untrained
in international refugee law or human rights law and motivated only by their employer's
business interest in avoiding sanctions, prevent the great majority of asylum-seekers who
lack visas from a chance to come to Germany to lodge an asylum request. The private
employees act to enforce German law. Their actions turn away thousands of individuals
who may face threats to their life or freedom due to their political views, nationality,
religion, race, or social group. These efforts to enforce German law run counter to the nonrefoulement provision of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Since 1993 these preventive measures focused on air travel have assumed vast new
significance because the constitutional amendment has changed the ground rules for asylumseekers arriving in Germany by land. If the Sierra Leoneans, Tamils, or Afghans travel
overland to Germany rather than attempt to enter Germany by air, they will face German
border guards rather than airline employees. The border guards will also demand that those
who wish to enter Germany produce valid German visas, of course, but prior to 1993 those
physically present at the border had the possibility of overcoming the visa requirement.
Those who requested asylum at the border were entitled to enter Germany and file an
asylum application, even if they lacked a valid visa. The adoption of the safe third country
principle in 1993 eliminated the possibility of seeking asylum at the border. The land
barriers now are as impenetrable to asylum-seekers as those erected at airports overseas.
VI.

RESTRICTION TO ACCESS TO THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE

Asylum-seekers who somehow cross the border and enter Germany are, in general,
still out of luck. New legal measures, the heart of the 1993 constitutional amendment,
create major restrictions to access to the asylum procedure even for those physically present
in Germany. In examining them, consider the case of an Armenian woman who sought
asylum in Germany in October 1993. She had been an officer in the Soviet army and faced
persecution in newly independent Armenia for what some said was unforgivable
collaboration with the Soviet occupying forces. 60 Her precise travel route was unclear; a
typical journey from Armenia would have passed first through Russia, then through Ukraine
and Poland before arriving in Germany.

59. In a related development, the British have recently begun posting airline liaison officers at the Prague
airport in the Czech Republic in order to prevent airline passengers from flying to the United Kingdom and

seeking asylum there. British Airline Liaison Officers to be Posted at PragueAirport, MIGRATION Nrts StIIn",
Dec. 2000, at 16.
60. Interview with asylum-seeker at the office of Annette Koppinger-Rashid, Auslanderbeauftrgte (Foreign
Representative) for the city of Schwerin, in Schwerin, Mecklenberg-Vorpommem (June 20, 1994).
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Safe Third County Principle

The major instrument of the new German asylum regime is the safe third country
principle. In effect, it is Germany's second line of defense. It is applied both at and inside
the German border to deny asylum-seekers-at least, the subset of asylum-seekers who
somehow overcome the visa requirements and the carrier sanctions and manage to arrive in
Germany-access to the asylum procedure. It operates on the premise that asylum-seekers
who travel through safe countries before they reach Germany should apply for asylum in the
transit countries.

The safe third country policy adopted by Germany may sound like a neutral policy
based on a common sense approach to the travel routes of many asylum-seekers. It is not.
It is a cynical approach to the thousands of asylum-seekers who request-and sometimes
desperately need-protection from persecution. It is an evasion of the international legal
requirement that forbids nations from turning away from their borders refugees in need of
protection.

Since 1993, the safe third country principle dominated asylum policy in Germany, yet
there is nothing in international refugee law that justifies this approach. It effectively bars
access to asylum and significantly heightens the chances that refoulement, or return to
persecution, will occur. This is not merely a theoretical problem. Many practical
consequences of the safe third country rule exist, and they are often dire. Those arriving at
the German border from a safe third country will not be allowed to present their asylum
claims, no matter how compelling. Instead, they will be immediately returned to the third
country. The German approach does not presume that the asylum-seekers lack a wellfounded fear of persecution or are unworthy of protection. Rather, the German law insists
that asylum-seekers seek protection in another country that they happened to pass through.
Theoretically, they will be allowed to present
their asylum claims in those third countries,
61
but in reality, this often does not happen.
The 1993 constitutional amendment unequivocally states that those who enter
Germany from one of the European Union member states are ineligible for asylum in
Germany because the EU countries are all safe. This rule applies no matter what country
the asylum-seekers originally fled, nor what persecution they fear, nor what family members
may already reside in Germany.
In addition, the amendment states that those who enter Germany after traveling
through non-EU countries are ineligible for asylum if those countries are safe. Safe third
countries are defined as those that guarantee the application of the 1951 Refugee

Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights and have been designated as
safe by Parliament. In 1993, acting pursuant to the constitutional amendment, Parliament
named the Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, and Switzerland as safe countries. Together,
the fifteen European Union states and the additional countries designated as safe form a
zone that completely surrounds Germany.62 By creating this all-encompassing cordon
61. See DANIsH REFUGEE CoUNCrL, SAFE THIRD CoUNTRY PouctEs WEuROPEAz CotNTdJES (1997). Sce
also THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND ExILES (ECRE), SAFE TmIRD COUNTRJES: Mrits AND
REALITIES app. B, Case Histories (1995), available at http:tUwww.ccr.orglarchivcs3c.pdf (last visited Mar. I,
2001) [hereinafter SAFE THiRD COUNTRIES]; U.S. COmiI'rEE FOR REFUGEES, AT FoRTRE.ss EuROPE's Mo.T:
THE SAFETHIRD COUNTRY CONCEPT (1997).
62. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal. Spain,
and the United Kingdom comprised the European Community, as it was then knoI
at the time of the 1993
constitutional amendment The Law of Asylum Procedure lists the following safe countries: Finland, Norway,

Austria, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic. Since this law was enacted in 1993, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden have joined the European Union. Asylverfahrensgestz § 26a, v. 27.07.93 (BGBI.1 S.1361)
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sanitaire, Germany effectively eliminated access to the grant of asylum still nominally
enshrined in its constitution.
The safe third country principle applies to all asylum-seekers in Germany, whether
they come by land, air, or sea. Those who come by land are immediately turned back at the
border based on the safe third country rule. In 1997, the Federal Administrative Court
upheld this rule even for asylum-seekers who have been locked inside a vehicle as they

passed through the safe third country, absolutely unable to apply for asylum there. 6-

Asylum-seekers who reach Germany are presumed to have come by land-and accordingly
to have passed through safe countries, thus making them ineligible for asylum-unless they
can prove they arrived by air or sea without passing through a safe country while in transit.'(
As discussed earlier, asylum-seekers who attempt to travel to Germany by air are
generally turned back at the point of embarkation by airline employees. If they manage to
obtain some form of visa and board an airplane that touches down in a safe country en route,
they will be turned away from Germany without any examination of their asylum claim. If
the plane did not land in a safe country before arriving in Germany, they will be allowed to
enter to face an extremely accelerated asylum procedure at the airport.
It is generally easy for the German authorities to identify whether airplane flights have
landed or re-fueled in a safe third country before arriving in Germany. All air passengers on
those flights are precluded from applying for asylum and are returned immediately to the
third country.65 These departures occur so promptly that the Border Guard does not
consider them deportations. The Border
Guard denominates them returns, and does not
66
record them in deportation statistics.

In contrast, it is more difficult for German authorities to determine the route of
asylum-seekers who enter clandestinely by land or sea. Many of these asylum-seekers
attempt to forestall their return to a third country by destroying or concealing all evidence of
the countries through which they traveled. A lack of evidence connecting the asylum-seeker
to one of the safe third countries does not allow asylum-seekers to escape the safe third
country principle. Since all asylum-seekers who entered by land must have passed through
a safe third country, the German authorities have concluded that the 1993 constitutional
amendment renders these asylum-seekers ineligible for asylum whether or not they can be
linked to a particular safe third country. All asylum-seekers without documents at the
[Law on Asylum Procedure]. The safe third country rule was endorsed at the EU level in a 1992 resolution and
has been implemented throughout the Union with serious implications for refugee protection in Europe,
Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third Countries, Dec. 1, 1992, Doe.
4464/I1/95 CIREA 3.
63. No Asylum if Arrival by Land Route, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Oct. 1997, at 8 (citing the Federal

Administrative Court (BVerwGE) decision of September 2, 1997). Traveling through a safe third country
rendered them ineligible for asylum, even though they risked persecution in their homeland. Because the
applicants in the case did not know which countries they had traveled through, however, they could not be
returned to a safe third country. Accordingly, they could seek a lesser form of protection in Germany, but not
asylum.
64.

Asylum-seekers Who Claim to Have Arrived by Air Must be Able to ProvideProofof This, MIoRATION

NEws SHEET, July 1999, at 11 (citing the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE) decision of June 29, 1999),
65. See Asylverfahrensgesetz §§ 18a(1), 18(2)(1), v. 27.07.93 (BGBL.I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
This, of course, can only be accomplished if the German Border Guard has evidence that the asylum-seekers came
through a particular safe third country. If the asylum-seekers have not yet left an airplane arriving from a safe
third country, the Border Guard has crucial evidence. If the asylum-seekers have left their airplanes and have lost
or destroyed information showing which flight brought them to Germany, the Border Guard lacks evidence of
their route and cannot return them. Even if the Border Guard can show that the asylum-seeker must have come to
Germany through a third country (e.g., the asylum-seeker arrived on one of three airplanes, all of which originated
in a safe third country), none of the third countries will allow the asylum-seekers to enter unless there is proof that
they traveled to Germany through that particular third country.
66. Interview with Herr Ludwig Rippert, Federal Border Guard, in Frankfurt/Main (June 20, 1996).
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border or within the expanded border zone are presumed to have crossed a safe third

country. Unless the asylum-seekers can prove they entered by air or sea w7ithout having
passed through a safe third country, they are not allowed to apply for asylum.6

The Armenian asylum-seeker mentioned earlier falls into this category. If she had

presented herself to a border post and requested asylum, German officials would have
immediately returned her to Poland, with no examination of her asylum claim. The same
would occur even if she had crossed the border clandestinely and then been stopped twenty
kilometers inside German territory. If she had tickets or documents indicating she had
traveled through Poland, German authorities would have turned her over to the Polish
border guards at once. If she had destroyed all evidence that she had passed through
Poland, German officials could not return her to Poland. She would face a presumption,
though, that she had crossed some safe country and, accordingly, would be ineligible to
apply for asylum.
This approach prevents almost all asylum-seekers from obtaining asylum in Germany,
but it fails to solve the practical problem of sending them away. Countries bordering
Germany generally refuse to admit asylum-seekers without proof that they entered Germany
from their particular territory. Consequently, asylum-seekers have a great incentive to lose
all evidence concerning the travel route to Germany and to repress all distinct memory of
the journey. They will not obtain asylum, but they may prevent immediate expulsion to
another country. If they are lucky, they may, as discussed below, gain temporary residence
in Germany.
The importance that travel documents assume leads to a major hidden cost of the safe
third country principle in Germany: the corrosive atmosphere of deceit and mistrust that has
been created in the asylum system. Asylum-seekers who have managed to cross the border
have an exceedingly powerful incentive to lie about their travel route. They often view the
truth as an instantaneous expulsion order. German authorities know that many asylumseekers lie about their journeys to Germany. Although the basis for the fear of persecution
is logically distinct from the details of the journey, the officials begin to question the truth of
the other details of the asylum claims that begin with major misstatements or bald-faced lies

about the travel route. These asylum-seekers know that the authorities know that they are
lying, but the consequences for telling the truth about the travel route are too severe.

Due to the centrality of the safe third country rule and the resulting ineligibility for
asylum of those who have transgressed it, the determination of the asylum-seeker's transit
route becomes critical in many cases. Though so much rests on this decision, there are no
safeguards surrounding it. Three elements of the safe third country practice combine to
create serious legal problems: the unreviewable decisionmaking at the border, the expanded
border zone, and the difficulties of obtaining access to the asylum procedure in third
countries.
1.

Decision-making at the Borders

There are no procedural safeguards and there is no transparency surrounding the
decisions to return asylum-seekers to safe third countries. The potential consequences of
the safe third country principle can be exceedingly harsh. The overwhelming majority of
asylum-seekers who come to Germany run afoul of this provision. It is, therefore, crucial
67.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Entry by air, of course, is difficult due to the praviously

discussed visa requirement and carrier sanctions. Those who do manage to enter by air face the limitations of thz
accelerated airport procedure, which will be discussed later.
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that the conclusion that an asylum-seeker traveled through certain countries is well-founded
and accurate.

In fact, though, a guard at the border checkpoint makes this critical decision. There is
no appeal. There is no opportunity to seek administrative reconsideration. There is no
chance to obtain judicial review before the border guard acts. The individual border guard
has absolute authority.
Concerns about fair and accurate decision-making in this setting are intensified by the
difficulties in establishing sustained monitoring of the border guards' decision-making. The
border area is closely guarded, and the inner workings of the border guard stations are not
visible to the ordinary public. By and large, border guards exercise their absolute authority
outside the public view. Decisions of such great importance to human life and liberty
should not be consigned to unreviewable government action.
2.

Expanded Border Zone

Concerns about the integrity of decisions at the border assume even greater importance
because they apply to many decisions that are made a significant distance from the border.
An expanded border zone stretching thirty kilometers from the border is treated as the
functional equivalent of the border. 68 Anyone stopped within this sizable, expanded border
zone is deemed to be at the border. The procedural protections that apply to government
decisions made in other circumstances within Germany do not apply. Border guards can
stop asylum-seekers anywhere in this large area, decide they came through a safe third
country, and return them immediately to that country. Again, there is no appeal. The
practice within the expanded border zone magnifies concerns about the potential for abuse.
3.

Safety in Third Countries

Most fundamentally, the safe third country rule can lead to terrible consequences
because it is based on a flawed premise. German law presumes asylum-seekers will be able
to present their asylum claims in a legitimate and well-functioning asylum procedure when
they are returned to the safe country. This presumption allows Germany to turn away
asylum-seekers who have passed through safe third countries no matter how compelling
their fears of persecution. As a practical matter, this presumption is often incorrect. Despite
the possibilities of mistreatment that may accompany the return, the German authorities do
not determine whether individual asylum-seekers will be admitted to the asylum process in
the safe third country; they simply return them to that country. Although German
government officials say that asylum-seekers returned to third countries are provided with
written documentation that informs them they must apply for asylum in the third country and
that notifies third country officials that asylum-seekers have not received full consideration
of their asylum claims
in Germany,69 refugee advocates in Germany assert that, in practice,
70
occur.
not
does
this
68. See Checks by Border Police Inside the Country, MIGRATION NEwS SHEET, July 1998, at 2. In July
1998 the Parliament approved legislation authorizing the German Border Police to stop and interrogate for any
reason whatsoever any person within the 30 kilometer border zone.

69. Interview with Jilrgen Haberand, Ministry of Interior, in Bonn (Sept. 29, 1998). The Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted recommended guidelines advising member states, including
Germany and all the oter EU states, to ensure before returning an asylum-seeker to a third state that the asylum-

seeker will have the opportunity to request asylum in the third state and that the third state will be informed that
the merits of the asylum ease have not been examined in the returning state. GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION OF
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The situations in Poland and the Czech Republic, Germany's eastern neighbors and
designated safe third countries, raise particular concern. Newly emerging from communist
rule and struggling to transform themselves into market economies, Poland and the Czech
Republic receive many of the asylum-seekers returned by Germany due to the safe third
country rule. Only recently has either country even begun to receive and recognize refugees
officially. Poland did not accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention until the last week of
1991. The Czech Republic acceded to the Convention one month earlier. This was only
eighteen months before Germany amended its constitution to exclude from asylum all those
who had passed through a safe third country-including Poland and the Czech Republicprior to entering Germany.

The recent accessions to the 1951 Refugee Convention are emblematic of the newly

developing refugee policy in Poland and the Czech Republic. A little more than a decade
ago, when both countries were still ruled by communist regimes, there was no need for
refugee policy and refugee law. Few asylum-seekers sought refuge in those societies.
During the past decade the early beginnings of a refugee policy have become visible, but
there has been insufficient time and support for a mature refugee system with substantial
legal protection to develop.
For example, the Ministry of Interior in Poland established an Office for Immigration
and Refugee Affairs in 1993. 7' Until the last week of 1997, there was no Polish legislation
setting forth the framework for a refugee system and delineating the legal protections
73
provided to refugees. 72 The Office was forced to rely on the general Administrative Code
and the thirty year old Aliens Law.74 The new law, while an improvement over the past, has
been described by experts in Poland as unclear and easily misconstrued." 5 In late 1999,
concerns about the safety of asylum-seekers, particularly unaccompanied minor asylumseekers, returned to Poland from third countries, led the UNHCR to call for a halt in returns
until the situation in Poland could be substantially improved.76 It is fair to say that the
Polish refugee policy is in a preliminary stage and these beginning efforts are seriously
underfunded.
Until 2000, the legislation specifically addressed to refugees in the Czech Republic
was a relatively rudimentary law. Enacted as a quick response to burgeoning numbers of
refugees, the refugee law went into effect in 1991. 77 A short amendment went into effect in

THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY CONCEPT, RECCOMENDATION No. R (97) 22 A D EXPLANATORY MEIOrtA-NnuI.I

(1998).

70. Interview with Herbert Leuninger, Pro Asyl, in FrankfurtiMain (June 19, 1996); Interiew with Tina
Raedel, Advocate, Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht und Migration [Research Center on Refugees and Migration] in
Berlin (June 25, 1996); Interview with Peter Rauschenberg, Advocate, FIlchtlingsrat Leipzig [Leipzig Refugee
Council], in Leipzig (June 26, 1996).
71. See Tomasz Kuba Kozlowski, Poland Between Transit,Arslum Seeking and Immigration,HEAWRuG ON
THE SrIUATION OF REFUGEES AND ASYILUM SEEKERS IN CENTRAL AND EsTRN EUROPE 9-10 (Office for

Migration and Refugee Affairs, 1994).
72. Ustawa o cudozoziemcach [Aliens Law] o 25.06.97 (Pol.).
73. KODEKS POST POWANIA ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [CODE OF ADmiNIsRATvE PROCEDURE] o 14.06.60
(Pol.).
74. Ustawa o cudozoziemcach [Aliens Lav] o 29.02.63 (PoL).
75. Jack Chleby & Wojciech Trojan, The Refugee Status DeterminationProcedurein Poland, 12 INT'L J. OF
REFUGEE L 212, 219 (2000).
76. UNrED NATIONS HIGH COMMISsIONER OF REFUGEES, BACKGROUND LNTOR,%%TIoN ON TIIE SITUATION
IN THE REPUBLICH OF POLAND IN THE CONTEXr OF THE RETURN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS (Dee*. 1999).

77- Zdkon 49811990 Sb. (Concerning Refugees) (Czech Rep.).
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1994.78 These early legislative efforts were supplemented by more 79thorough statutory
development in the asylum law that took effect at the beginning of 2000.
Although the details differ, the overall picture for refugees in Poland and the Czech
Republic is similar. In both countries the infrastructure is underdeveloped, and refugee law
and policy are nascent. Each country now can only provide housing to a few thousand
refugees and asylum-seekers, far fewer than the tens of thousands sent back by Germany
each year. Furthermore, both countries have devoted a substantial portion of their refugee
resources to temporarily protected persons who have fled wars in the Balkans. While this is
clearly admirable, asylum-seekers from elsewhere get lost in the shuffle.
Thus, despite the minimal legal framework for refugees and the paucity of resources

available for asylum-seekers, Germany returns many thousands of individuals to Poland and
the Czech Republic each year. Statistics provided by the German Border Guard for a recent
year are representative. 80 In 1997, German authorities arrested 35,205 undocumented
individuals at their borders. Of these, 23,089 were arrested at Germany's eastern borders:
8,699 at the Polish border and 14,390 at the Czech border. In addition, the German Border
8
Guard refused entry to 16,080 at the Polish border and 16,730 at the Czech border. '
Further, German authorities stopped 5,589 individuals inside Germany and returned them to
Poland within forty-eight hours pursuant to the German-Polish readmission agreement. The
number stopped inside Germany and promptly sent to the Czech Republic for readmission
reached 10,254. The Border Guard reported that they arrested 40,201 foreigners at the
borders for illegal entry in 1998. Of these, more than 19,000 were arrested at the Czech
border and approximately 5,000 at the Polish border. In addition, the Border Guard turned
back 60,000 foreigners at the borders. 82 The number of illegal border crossings reported in
1999 decreased to 37,789.83 Approximately 13,000 were apprehended84 at the German-Czech
border and roughly 3,000 were arrested at the German-Polish border.
The Border Guard statistics do not separate asylum-seekers from other would-be
migrants, so it is impossible to know the precise percentage of asylum-seekers in these
figures. It is obvious, though, that many asylum-seekers must be included in the tens of
thousands whom Germany turns back to Poland and the Czech Republic each year because
many asylum-seekers pass through these countries each year en route to Germany. In a real
sense, the safe third country principle in Germany obliterates legal protection for asylumseekers and treats them like all other migrants.
The situation for asylum-seekers returned to Poland is particularly worrisome. The
legal provisions protecting asylum-seekers are even sparser than in the Czech Republic, and
the infrastructure is minimal. Moreover, because there are accommodations for only a tiny
percentage of those applying for asylum in Poland, almost all those returned by Germany
must rely on their survival skills to find food and shelter during the asylum process.
78. Zkon 317/1993 Sb. (Amending and Supplementing ZAkon 317/1990 Sb. (Concerning Refugees))
(Czech Rep.).
79. Zakon 325/1999 Sb (on Asylum) (Czech Rep.). This legislation includes all three of the restrictivo
concepts adopted by the 1993 German constitutional amendment: safe third country, § 2(2); safe country of
origin, § 2(1); and accelerated review procedures in cases deemed manifestly unfounded, § 29.
80. See E-mail from Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht und Migration [Research Center on Refugees and
Migration] to Maryelen Fullerton (Nov. 9, 1998, 16:55 EST) (providing statistics of the Federal Border Guard
(Bundesgrenzschutz)) (on file with the Texas International Law Journal).
81. See id. These individuals were turned away, but not arrested.
82. MoreArrestsforlllegalEntry, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Sept. 1993, at 3.
83. efrns Migration Report (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.uni-bamberg.de/%7eba6ef3/dokzO0 d.htm
(last visited Mar.27, 2001).
84. Number ofPersons Caughtfor Illegal Entry in 1999 Fell by 6%, MIGRATION NEWs SHEET, Apr. 2000,
at 7.
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More troubling, though, are reports that asylum-seekers turned back to Poland from
Germany are effectively prevented from applying for asylum in Poland. German
government officials assert that they see no indication that asylum-seekers returned to
Poland are denied access to the asylum procedure there. 85 Nonetheless, credible reports
give cause for concern. For example, the Research Center on Refugees and Migration notes
that the German Border Guard arrested 14,000 foreigners within the thirty kilometer
!
expanded border zone along the Polish border in 1995.8
6 Of these, 7000 were citizens of
Romania. They were flown from Germany to Romania. 7 The other 7000 individuals were
detained in German Border Guard camps for up to forty-eight hours and then delivered to
Polish officials, who detained them for up to another forty-eight hours.3 The Polish Border
Guard transported 2000 or more by bus to Ukraine, which signed a readmission agreement
with Poland. These individuals had no access to the asylum process in Poland. Indeed, they
had no access to lawyers, judges, doctors, or other advocates while detained in Germany,
and no access to representatives of government organizations while detained in Poland.8 7
The story of the former Soviet army officer from Armenia illustrates the bleak
situation awaiting asylum-seekers returned to Poland. After entering Germany and
requesting asylum, she was assigned to an asylum shelter in the eastern region of
Mecklenberg-Westem Pomerania. While waiting for a decision on her asylum application,
she was awakened one night.90
At 3:00 a.m. on January 3, 1994, police came to my room. They unlocked my
door and told me I had five minutes to get ready to leave. They told me to sign a
paper, but I refused because I couldn't read it. They yelled at me in German.
They wouldn't let me borrow a coat. I only had light clothes. They put me into
a car and we drove a long time. I begged them to stop to let me relieve myself,
but they wouldn't. They drove me to the border. They made me stand outside in
the cold for forty minutes while they talked to the Polish border guards. Then
they left.
The Polish border guards gave me a pass to remain for three days. I asked what I
should do without food, warm clothes, or money. The Polish border guards told
me that was my problem. They said I could stay in the reception area for three
days and then would have to leave Poland. They said I could not file an asylum
application in Poland.
While I was in the Polish camp, I saw Polish ladies go back and forth across the
border every day to buy and sell things. I had some plastic bags with me, and I
pretended they were for shopping. On January 6, I managed to cross the border
back into Germany. I stood in a crowd of Polish ladies and walked with them
across the border into Germany. I went to the police in the border town and

85. See Interview with Jtrgen Haberand, supra note 69.

86. See Helmut Dietrich, Export des deutschen Abschiebesystems nach Ostcuropa(FFM, VOR'TR GE DER
FORSCHUNGSGESELLSCHAFT FLUCHT UND MIGRATION [Export of the German Deportation System to Eastern

Europe, TALKS GIVEN BY THE RESEARCH CENTER ON REFUGEES AM) MIGRATION] (May 25, 1996) (on file with
the Texas International Law Journal).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.

90. This sequence of events does not appear to be typical. I mention it not to suggest that this is what
generally happens, but because it vividly portrays one asylum-seeker's experience in Poland after being sent back
from Germany.
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spoke to them in Russian and broken German. I told them there had been
91 a
mistake. I said I needed to return to the asylum center. I asked for a lawyer.
Although it did not happen to this asylum-seeker, there are reports that Poland has
begun detaining as illegal immigrants many of those turned back from Germany and that
detention in Poland is sometimes accompanied by criminal prosecution for violating border
controls. Reliable information on the fate of those returned to other countries is notoriously
difficult to obtain. If some of these reports are true, however, this is particularly troubling
treatment for those precluded from seeking asylum in Germany based on the premise that
they could request asylum in Poland.
B.

Readmission Agreements

The pernicious effect of the safe country rule is compounded by the multitude of
readmission agreements that Germany and other European states have entered. Germany
has negotiated readmission agreements with more than twenty countries, including Algeria,
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Latvia, Romania, Vietnam, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, as well as Poland and the Czech Republic. 92 In addition, many of these
countries have negotiated readmission agreements with other nations. For example, Poland
has readmission agreements with many countries to its east and south, including Ukraine,
the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Moldova, with which Germany has not concluded
readmission agreements. 93 This elaborate and interlocking network of agreements,
combined with the safe third country principle and the accelerated procedures applied to
claims deemed manifestly unfounded, 94 heightens the risk that asylum-seekers may be sent
back to conditions of danger without ever undergoing a thorough examination of their
claims.
The provisions of these agreements vary, but they generally permit the receiving state
to send asylum-seekers and others back to another state that they either fled or passed
through en route to the receiving state. The receiving state sends all those without
authorization to be in the receiving state back to the readmitting country. If the individuals
are asylum-seekers, the receiving state generally refuses to hear the asylum claims, but
rather, sends the asylum-seekers to the readmitting country for any determination as to
whether there are well-founded claims for asylum. The conditions in some of the countries
that signed readmission agreements with Germany and its eastern neighbors are extremely
unstable. In others, the human rights situation is tenuous, and the asylum policy, for all
practical purposes, is non-existent. As a consequence, these readmission agreements raise
serious concerns for the ultimate safety of asylum-seekers turned away without a thorough
hearing of their asylum claims: those'rejected without a hearing due to the safe third country
rule or those rejected in short-circuited proceedings because their claims were perceived to
be manifestly unfounded.
91.

Interview with asylum-seeker, supra note 60.

92.

See Overview ofExisting Readmission Agreement/Arrangements, MIGRATION NEvs StrEET, Nov. 1997,

at 8-9 (reporting also that Germany has an ad hoe readmission agreement with the United Kingdom, plus full.
fledged readmission agreements with Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Georgia, Italy, Latvia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia).
93. See id. Poland has readmission agreements with Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, lungary,
Moldova, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine in Central Europe, and Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in Western Europe. A draft readmission
agreement with Canada also exists.
94. See Manifestly Unfounded Applications and Accelerated Procedures, infra part VII.
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Because there are multiple layers of readmission agreements, the first invocation of a
readmission agreement may have far-reaching and unforeseen consequences. Although

German law only permits German border guards to return asylum-seekers to safe third
countries that adhere to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights

Convention, German law is silent regarding the standards that other countries may later
apply to asylum-seekers rejected at Germany's borders. Some German government officials
have said that they annually scrutinize the safe third country policies of countries that
Germany treats as safe third countries, to ensure that they protect returned asylum-seekers
from refouleinent, or eventual return to the country where they fear persecution. This review
does not apply
to EU member states, which are deemed categorically safe under the German
95
constitution.

In practice, the countries Germany treats as safe third countries may well have
readmission agreements with countries that have not put into effect the Refugee Convention
and the European Convention on Human Rights, and thus would not be considered safe
under German law. By ignoring the reality of the web of readmission agreements that bind
its neighbors, Germany is complicit in a flawed process. With no examination of the merits
of their claims, asylum-seekers are shunted from Germany to safe third countries, then from
safe third countries to countries that may not be and that Germany may not view as safe.
Returning for a moment to the case of the Soviet military officer from Armenia, if the
German authorities had evidence that she passed through Poland, they would have refused
to provide her any asylum hearing whatsoever. German law designates Poland, a country
that has ratified the Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention, as a
safe third country, so the German Border Guard would have returned her directly to the
Polish authorities. If Polish officials had learned that the Armenian asylum-seeker had
entered Poland via Ukraine, they would have relied on the readmission agreement to return
her promptly to Ukraine. Denied access to the asylum process in both Germany and Poland,
the Armenian asylum-seeker would theoretically be able to seek refuge in Ukraine, but
Ukraine is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The refugee legislation enacted in
1993 is relatively untested. The thrust of Ukrainian refugee policy is directed toward

Afghanistan. Roughly seventy-six percent of the 3,000 recognized refugees are Afghans.9
Ukrainian authorities have not provided housing for refugees; asylum-seekers must fend for
themselves. 97 The economic crisis in Ukraine severely undercuts even minimal refugee
protection and assistance efforts.
Perhaps Ukraine would seek to push the asylum-seeker back to another country, such
as Russia, an earlier stop on her journey. Whether Russia, the fourth country in the chain, or
a subsequent fifth country, has a functioning asylum process and the ability to extend
protection to those fleeing persecution would be questionable. For example, although
Russia became a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1993, it had no international
refugee law during most of the 1990s.98 Refugee legislation was enacted in 1993, but it
applied only to those fleeing violence within the former Soviet territory.) A decree on
political asylum was adopted in 1995, but it was never put into effect. t ' a More recently, in

95.

See Interview with Jargen Haberland, supra note 69.

96. See DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL: UKRAINE 10 (1998) (on file with the Tcxas International Law Jounmal).
97. See id. at 12.
98. See Adriano Silvestri & Olga Tchernishova, The Lcgal Framework Regulating Asylum in the Russian
Federation,10 INT'LJ. REFUGEEL 184 (1998).

99. Seeid. at184-85.
100. Id. at 187.
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mid-1997, new refugee legislation was enacted; this law is short,
has internally contradictory
0
provisions, and leaves large areas to administrative discretion.' '
Moreover, even if a functioning asylum procedure is in place, many reports indicate
that government officials who receive asylum-seekers already rejected by several other
countries conclude that their case lacks substance. Officials in these receiving countries
often ignore the distinction between refusals to allow access to the asylum process based on
the safe third country
principle or readmission agreements and rejection of the merits of the
02
asylum claim. 1
As a result of the spiderweb of readmission agreements, many asylum-seekers rejected
by Germany on the theory they should apply for asylum in a country that they had passed
through earlier may find themselves caught in a chain of events that allows neither escape
nor an asylum hearing. Often, countries later in the chain lack an effective refugee policy
and have not fully implemented the 1951 Refugee Convention and international human
rights treaties.
The actual treatment of a Kosovar Albanian family in 1998 furnishes another powerful
demonstration of the actual danger inherent in the safe third country rule and the system of
readmission agreements.10 3 A man and his family had fled Kosovo because he took part in a
hunger strike of miners; he had been hiding from the Serb police since then. When the
family arrived in Germany, they were immediately sent back to Austria, the safe third
country they crossed to come to Germany. Austria expelled them to Hungary, and the
Hungarian authorities accompanied them to the Yugoslav border. Back in Yugoslavia, the
entire family was seriously mistreated by the police. They then fled a second time to
Germany, where they received a negative decision on their asylum claim. The head of the
family then tried to flee alone to Sweden but was caught by the police and brought back to
Germany and imprisoned for more than thirty days while awaiting deportation. On April 29,
1998, he was deported for a second time to Kosovo, where he says Serb police interrogated
and beat him upon arrival. His family remains illegally in Germany, where his children are
in special therapy for trauma cases and victims of torture.
The responsibility for such cases lies heavily-although not solely-on Germany. The
safe third country list promulgated by Germany and other EU member states has encouraged
other countries to formulate similar lists of countries asylum-seekers may have crossed
earlier on their journey.1" 4 The resulting chain deportation process pushes asylum-seekers
closer and closer to the land they fled. The possibility that they might be returned to
persecution is real. Although each state claims it is only responsible for the sole decision it
makes, all the states are implicated in the final result because they know that returning
asylum-seekers to a neighboring state is likely to be only one step in a long process.
Germany and other states that begin the chain of deportation orders cannot escape
responsibility for the ultimate fate of asylum-seekers they turn away at their borders.
Indeed, the German Constitutional Court has recognized that international law
prohibits both direct and indirect return to the country where persecution is feared. 05 It
remains for German officials to take this ruling to heart. They must consider seriously the
possibility that the deportation or "return" under consideration may be the first link in a
dangerous chain. They must limit application of the safe third country concept to those
101. Seeid.at192.
102. See SAFE THIRD COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at app. B, Case Histories Nos. 1-2, 4, 7-8, 10, 13-14.
103. See Interviews by Fred Abramson, Human Rights Watch, in Kosovo (June 1998).
104. For example, as noted earlier, see supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text, the Czech Republic has
amended its refugee law to include passage through a safe third country as a basis for denial of asylum, and
Ukraine is considering adding a similar provision in 2001.
105. See BVerfGE 94,49.
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cases in which there has been an individualized determination that the state to which the
asylum-seeker will be readmitted has a full asylum procedure comporting with UNHCR
standards.'
The readmission agreements significantly exacerbate the safe third country rule that
Germany has adopted. They also heighten the difficulties created by curtailed procedures
applied to claims deemed manifestly unfounded. As explained below at greater length, the
streamlined procedures for these disfavored claims significantly limit the opportunities for
judicial review. As a consequence, asylum-seekers whose claims are rejected as manifestly
unfounded are more likely to be deported quickly. If they fall within the scope of one of
the more than twenty readmission agreements Germany has negotiated, they may be sent
back to a country with tenuous human rights policies, which may rely in turn on readmission
agreements it has negotiated with other states and send them back to another state with even
fewer established protections of human rights. Their ultimate refoulement is a major
concern. This system sends asylum-seekers to situations where they face danger due to their
nationality, religion, race, social group, or political opinion. In doing so, it violates both the
1951 Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention.

VII.

MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED APPLICATIONS AND
ACCELERATED PROCEDURES

The visa policy and carrier sanctions prevent asylum-seekers from reaching Germany.
Those who somehow arrive at the German borders face the safe third country principle,

which, coupled with the extensive network of readmission agreements, prevents many
asylum-seekers from gaining access to the asylum procedure. The relatively few who do

enter the asylum system may face substantially truncated and accelerated procedures. The
constitutional restrictions adopted in 1993 expressly reduce procedural protections formerly
accorded asylum-seekers. The lack of safeguards in the system that renders decisions about
applicants' fear of persecution increases the odds that the international law forbidding

refoulement will be violated.
The case of an Algerian asylum-seeker who arrived in Germany in October 1995
highlights some of the difficulties caused by the streamlined procedures. This asylum-

seeker reported that the Algerian military forces, thinking that he supported Islamic
fundamentalist groups in Algeria, administered electric shocks to torture him. 10 7 His need
for protection collided with the new German asylum law.
A.

Manifestly UnfoundedApplications

The 1993 amendment to the Constitution refers to asylum requests that are clearly
unjustified. The amendment states that deportation shall generally not be suspended
pending appeal in these manifestly unfounded cases. It also limits the scope of judicial
review available for these claims. The constitutional amendment does not, however, define
08
the operative term.

106. See GuDELNEs ON THE APPUCATION oF THE SAFE THIRD COmNTRY CoNcEPT, supra note 69.
107. Details of this case are reported in Administrative Court Orderedto Veri, Claims of Torture 4,an
Algerian Asylum-Seeker, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Sept. 1997, at 9 (citing FRNKFURTER RLI.DSCAU, Aug. 7,
1997).
108. See GRUNDGESETZ[GG] [Constitution] art. 16a(4) (F.R1G.).
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Earlier legislation indicated that an extremely broad range of circumstances would
lead an asylum application to be deemed "manifestly unfounded."' 0 9 For example, the
statutory term includes an asylum application based on flight from war or based on a general
emergency situation.110 It also includes an asylum application contradictory in several
important respects or one deemed to be inconsistent with well-known facts."' German
courts appear to be grafting the expansive statutory definition onto the constitutional
restriction. This has resulted in substantially fewer procedural protections for a large
number of asylum applicants." 2 Because the Algerian asylum-seeker arrived in Germany at
a time when there were outbursts of violence in certain areas in Algeria, refugee authorities
in Germany viewed him as someone fleeing from warfare or an emergency situation in parts
of his homeland. They did not believe his allegations of torture, so his case was deemed
manifestly unfounded.
Legislation implementing the constitutional amendment provides that asylum-seekers
whose claims have been rejected as manifestly unfounded must leave Germany within one
week. ' 3 They may challenge the government decision by filing a notice of appeal with the
Administrative Court within one week of the decision." 4 This is a significant acceleration
of the standard four-week period in which German litigants are generally allowed to prepare
their appeals.Is
Moreover, in contrast to the ordinary appellate practice in Germany, filing a notice 116
of
appeal does not provide an automatic stay of deportation in manifestly unfounded cases,
In order to suspend the effect of the deportation order, asylum-seekers must file two
separate applications with the court: an appeal on the merits of the asylum claim and a
request for a stay of the deportation order pending the appeal. Only those who obtain a
court order specifically delaying their deportation are permitted to remain,11 7 Many asylumseekers are baffled by this procedure, fail to file two separate applications, and are unable to
achieve the stay of deportation that the law, in theory, provides.
109. Section 30 of the Law on Asylum Procedure illustrates a variety of circumstances inwhich an asylum
application would be deemed manifestly unfounded. These include applications:
(1) in which the requirements for asylum under German law are obviously not present;
(2) by those who obviously came only for economic reasons or who flee war or a general emergency
situation;

(3)(1) which are contradictory or insubstantial inimportant respects, which do not correspond to wellknown facts, or which are based on falsified evidence;
(3)(2) in which the applicant disguises his identity or citizenship;
(3)(3) by applicants who have submitted another asylum claim using other personal data; or
(3)(4) which are submitted to forestall the threatened expiration ofpermission to remain in Germany.
Asylverfahrensgesetz § 30, v. 27.07.1993 (BGB1. I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
In its judgment of October 12, 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court has stated that the courts must provide
the legal definition of "manifestly unfounded" applications. BVerfGE 91,226 (228).
110. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 30(2), v. 27.07.93 (BGBI.I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
111. Id. § 30(3)(1).
112. For this sizable number if asylum-seekers affected, see infra text accompanying note 121.
113. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 36(1).

114. Id. § 74(l).
115. Generally, the applicant seeking review of the decision denying asylum has two weeks after service of
the decision to file an appeal, and has up to one month after the service of the decision to detail the grounds for
the appeal. Id. §§ 74(1), 74(2).
116. Id. § 75 (providing suspensive effect only for appeals from applications denied but not ruled manifestly
unfounded or inadmissible).
117. Id. §§ 36, 37. These asylum-seekers may challenge the negative decision with its one-week time limit
to leave Germany by relying on § 80(5) of the Administrative Court Code. If the Court rules in their favor they are
allowed to remain in Germany until one month after the final judicial decision in their asylum case. Interview
with Frau Krug Ritter, Supervisor, Federal Refugee Office, in Ntimberg/Zimdorf (June 18, 1996),
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Those who file the correct documents within one week of being rejected as manifestly
unfounded receive a hearing based solely on the written record. In reviewing challenges to
claims rejected as manifestly unfounded, the Administrative Court considers first the
accompanying request for suspensive effect. If the Court decides that there are no "serious
doubts as to the legality" of the negative decision, it will deny suspensive effect."18 The
Court has one week to render its decision on suspensive effect." 9 If the Court denies
suspensive effect, it will no longer consider the case, and no further appeals are possible. If
the Court concludes that the request may be simply unfounded rather than "manifestly
unfounded," it will grant suspensive effect.'20 It will then consider the merits of the case at
a later time.
The strictures on claims rejected as manifestly unfounded affect a large number of
asylum-seekers, approximately 26,000 applications in 1995; 25,000 in 1996; 27,000 in
1997; close to 25,000 in 1998; 22,000 in 1999; and more than 18,000 in 2000.21 Because
the route to judicial review is complicated and the chances of success limited, most asylumseekers rejected for having "manifestly unfounded" claims fail to appeal. Thus, tens of
thousands of asylum-seekers are turned away each year without any serious oversight by the
courts.
It is not only the large numbers that are troubling. Because the German definition of
manifestly unfounded claims includes those fleeing civil war or situations of general
violence,122 many claims are rejected as manifestly unfounded even though the authorities
concede that the asylum-seekers might face serious generalized violence if they return to
their homes. In practice, this means that asylum-seekers from regions suffering horrifying
violence, war, and persecution, such as Algeria in 1995 or Sierra Leone in 2000, can be
summarily rejected for presenting claims deemed manifestly unfounded. If they traveled
through countries that have readmission agreements with Germany, they may soon find
themselves sent to countries whose human rights and asylum policies are uncertain or worse.
Under the German approach to manifestly unfounded claims, many individuals will be
returned to situations of danger in violation of international law.
B.

AcceleratedAirportProcedure

In addition to disfavoring manifestly unfounded claims, the 1993 constitutional
amendment mandates an accelerated asylum procedure for those viewed as fleeing a safe
homeland. 123 This aspect of the new legal restrictions tends to come into play at the
international airports in Germany where arriving asylum-seekers may face an asylum
procedure even more accelerated than the quick pace prescribed for manifestly unfounded
claims. 124 Asylum-seekers who arrive at Germany's airports and who traveled through safe
third countries, originated from safe countries of origin, or lack valid travel documents are

118. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 36(4).
119. Id. § 36(3).
120. Id. §§ 38,75.
121. Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
122. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 30(2).
123. GRuNDGESETz[GG] [Constitution] art. 16a(3), (4) (F.RLG.).
124. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 18a. Frankfintllain airport receives by far the largest numbzr of asylumseekers, but other international airports such as those at Berlin-Schnefeld, Dasseldorf, Hamburg, and Munich
also receive considerable numbers of asylum-seekers. Fax from Pro Asyl to Marycllen Fullerton (Aug. 19, 1998)
(on file with the Texas International Law Journal).
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subject to an expedited procedure at the airport. 125 The nature of the accelerated procedure
varies depending on which of these factors triggers the procedure for the asylum-seeker.
The 1993 constitutional amendment authorizes Parliament to certify countries where
persecution generally does not occur. 126 Parliament acted promptly to create a list of "safe
countries of origin": Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Senegal, and the Slovak Republic.12 7 Those who arrive at the airport from a
designated safe country of origin are granted access to the accelerated proceeding, but they
face a presumption that they are not fleeing persecution. There is only a negligible chance
that asylum-seekers
28 from the lands considered safe countries of origin will be able to rebut
the presumption.1
Those who arrive without a valid passport or other travel document also face the
accelerated airport procedure. This group is largely composed of individuals apprehended
at passport control by officials who suspect they are using passports that have been
counterfeited or altered in some way. In some instances those possessing invalid passports
obtained them in a desperate attempt to escape persecution; in others they acquired them to
facilitate a trip motivated by
reasons unrelated to persecution. All are subject to the
29
expedited airport procedure.
As soon as a member of the Border Guard identifies asylum-seekers who come from a
safe country of origin or lack a valid passport,1" 0 the Border Guard detains them at the
airport and questions them. The Border Guard interviews often take place on the day of
arrival when asylum-seekers may be seriously disoriented. Scenes are common of recently
arrived asylum-seekers sound asleep in broad daylight in noisy rooms while other asylumseekers who arrived within the past twenty-four hours mill around waiting for instructions
from the Border Guard staff.131 The interviews by the Border Guard focus on the identities
of the asylum-seekers and the routes by which they entered Germany, but often also include
information relevant to the asylum claim.
Employees of the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (Federal
Refugee Office) stationed at the airport review the Border Guard files and then conduct a
second interview focused on the request for asylum. Contradictions with statements made to
the Border Guard upon arrival, when disoriented and perhaps frightened, may be used to
125. Those whom airport officials identify as having traveled through identifiable safe third countries are
returned there immediately without any hearing. See supra text accompanying note 63.

126.

GRuNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 16a(3) (F.R.G.). The Upper House of Parliament has the power

to ratify a list specifying countries where the legal instruments, the law as applied, and the general political

conditions indicate that persecution and inhuman and degrading treatment do not occur.
127. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 29a, Anlage 11.
128. German law permits the federal government to remove a country from the list of safe countries of
origin. If the government concludes that the legal or political conditions have changed so that a country can no

longer be presumed safe, the government may remove a country from the list without seeking the approval of
Parliament. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 29a(3). If the government concludes the situation has improved, the
government can then reinstate the country on the list, again without the consent of Parliament. For example,
Senegal was on the safe country of origin list until March 1996, when the government temporarily removed it

based on the occurrence there of inhuman and humiliating punishment. In November 1996, the German Ministry
of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs reinstated Senegal on the list of safe countries. See Senegal Is
Again a Safe Country, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Dec. 1996, at 12 (citing FRANKFURTER RtrNDSCHAU, Nov. 14,
1996).
129. Interview with Herr Ludwig Rippert, supra note 66.
130. Asylum-seekers who have a valid passport and/or equivalent travel document and have not come
through a safe third country or a safe country of origin are allowed to enter Germany. They are transported to the

nearby initial reception center for asylum-seekers. Thereafter they file their official requests for asylum and their
cases work their way through the regular asylum process. Id.

131. Author's visits to Frankfurt/Main airport detention center and interviews with staff (June 6, 1994, June
19, 1996).
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discredit the applicants. 3 2 The Federal Refugee Office staff then must reach a decision on
the merits of the asylum claim within two days of the application for asylum. 33 Under these
circumstances it seems unwise to rely on interviews of tired and disoriented individuals to
make what may be life and death decisions.
The few asylum-seekers whose applications receive a favorable decision may leave the
airport promptly. Those who are neither granted refugee status at the airport nor viewed as
having manifestly unfounded claims are taken to an initial reception center where they are
eligible to seek asylum pursuant to the standard asylum process.13
Those whose applications are denied as manifestly unfounded must remain in the
locked facility at the airport. 35 They have three days in which to file a petition with the
court to overturn the agency decision. 36 Within four more days they must provide the court
with their reasons for seeking a reversal of the decision. The court must review the petition
and accompanying file and issue a decision within
two weeks, during which time the
37
asylum-seeker must remain in airport detention.
This is the precise situation the Algerian asylum-seeker faced. Arriving at the
Frankfurt airport in October 1995, he immediately applied for asylum based on the torture
he had suffered from the government military forces that had viewed him as a political
opponent. The Federal Refugee Office interviewed him in the accelerated airport procedure
and rejected his claim, as did the Frankfurt Administrative Court. Only after the
administrative decision and the first level of judicial review were over, which together took
less than two weeks, was the asylum-seeker able to obtain medical evidence that he had
been tortured. Subsequent applications to the Frankfurt Administrative Court were
nonetheless denied. Finally, a refugee organization agreed to represent him and filed a
claim with the Federal Constitutional Court, which overruled the lower court and ordered a

reexamination of the case.138 After more than one
year in the airport holding area, he was
139

allowed to leave the airport for a refugee center.
The accelerated procedure at the airport has, to date, precluded effective counseling or
legal assistance in almost all cases. There is not enough time to locate attorneys competent
in asylum law,14° nor enough time for attorneys to interview asylum-seekers and prepare
substantial asylum applications or court petitions.' 4 ' Moreover, the problems that generally
hinder asylum-seekers from preparing a compelling presentation of their cases on short
notice-such as the difficulty of recounting a fully fleshed out description of the
132. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated that the main source of information for deciding asylum
requests must be the Federal Refugee Office interview, rather than the Border Guard interview BVerfGE 94,49.
133. If the decision cannot be reached within two days the asylum-seeker shall be released from the airport
proceedings and transferred to the regular procedure. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 18a(6)[2).
134. Id. § 18a(1).
135. According to the Federal Border Guard, the accelerated procedure typically results in ten percent
denials as manifestly unfounded, some of which are overturned by the court. According to those figures,
therefore, close to ninety percent enter Germany without staying in the airport for more than three or four days.
See Interview with Herr Ludwig Rippert, supra note 66.
136. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 18a(4). This deadline is even shorter than the one veck deadline for filing
appeals of claims rejected as manifestly unfounded in proceedings outside the airport conteat. In contrast to the
procedure regulating manifestly unfounded claims decided outside the airport, however, the appals petition in the
accelerated airport procedure has suspensive effect.
137. Id. § 18a(6)(3).
138. Administrative Court Ordered to VeriA, Claims of Torture by an Algerian Asylum-Sccker, supra note
107 (citing the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE) decision of August 6, 1997).
139. Id. (citing FRANKFuRTER RUNtDSCHAU, Aug. 7, 1997).
140. See Interview with Frau Richter-Kog, Social Services, in Frankfurt am Main Airport (June 19, 1996).
141. Interview vith Hubert Heinhold, refugee advocate and attorney, in Munich (June 17, 1996).
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circumstances that impelled the flight and the near impossibility of obtaining corroborating
medical evidence-are intensified by the accelerated pace of the special airport procedure.
Even if the attorney could intervene in a timely manner, generally there are no funds to
pay the attorney. Recently, the Federal Ministry of the Interior agreed that the German
Federation of Lawyers could provide legal counseling for asylum-seekers at five
international airports.1 42 The state-subsidized legal counseling is limited to those asylumseekers in the accelerated airport procedure whose applications have been rejected as
manifestly unfounded. This legal counseling is not available before
1 43 and during the first
hearing with the Federal Refugee Office staff members at the airport.
While this is a step in the right direction, it is still inadequate. Without effective legal
counseling for those in the accelerated airport procedure, thousands of asylum applicants
there each year are doomed. Even with much greater support for legal counseling, the
extremely short deadlines will continue to impose an enormous burden on those preparing
asylum applications.
The Algerian asylum-seeker's detention for over a year in locked facilities at the
airport with minimal opportunities for exercise was itself a grim ordeal.144 Much grimmer is
the fate of all those others who have a well-founded fear of persecution back home, but who
lack the resources to obtain a lawyer and to gather corroborating evidence in two days or
two weeks. The vast majority of asylum-seekers in the accelerated airport procedure and in
the truncated procedure applied to manifestly unfounded claims at the reception centers are
unable to attract organizational backing for their asylum requests. 45 They obtain limited or
no legal assistance and the expedited process makes it almost impossible to gather medical
reports or other evidence crucial to their asylum claims. The opportunities for errors are
great in the accelerated procedures, and the consequences are severe.
Without confidence in the ability of the system to determine accurately those who fear
threats to their life and freedom, it is impossible to conclude that Germany is adhering to its
obligations under international law. If the German authorities do not take steps to make this
procedure one in which asylum-seekers have the time to tell their story in a comprehensible
manner and to develop corroborating evidence, the threat of incorrect decisions increases,
Erroneous decisions will result in asylum-seekers being returned to danger in violation of
the 1951 Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention. The pace and
the circumstances of the expedited processing threaten Germany's ability to comply with its
international law obligations.
This is not a small concern. Substantial numbers of asylum-seekers' claims are heard
in the accelerated airport procedure. In 1994, close to 2600 asylum-seekers passed through
this procedure, and the numbers increased in 1995 to almost 4600.146 In 1996 there were
4300 asylum-seekers in the accelerated airport procedure, 147 including 290 unaccompanied

142. Still No Independent Legal Advisors at Airports Despite Release of EU. Funds, MIGRATION N3WS
SHEET, June 1998, at 10 (citing FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, May 23, 1998).
143. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Report to the German Government on the Visit to Frankfurt am Main Airport Carried Out by the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
from 25 to 27 May 1998 (May 27, 1999), available at http://wwv.cpt.coe.int/en/reports/inf9910enl.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2001).
144. Administrative Court Orderedto Verfiy Claims of Torture by an Algerian Asylum-Seeker, supra note
107, at 9.

145. See id.
146.
147.

Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.

Id.
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minors. 14 8 In 1997 approximately 2300 asylum-seekers faced the accelerated airport
procedure, followed by 1700 in 1998, 1300 in 1999, and almost 1100 in 2000. t" 9
VIII.

THE REGULAR ASYLUM PROCEDURE

The constitutional changes mandating the accelerated proceedings, the presumptions
against safe countries of origin, and the safe third country rule all build upon and affect the
basic asylum procedure that has developed in Germany over the past few decades. Certain
non-constitutional aspects of the basic asylum procedure raise further questions about the
accuracy and the reliability of the decisionmaking. It is important, therefore, to examine the

basic asylum system. Doing so in light of the application of a woman from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (formerly ZaYre) whose asylum claim involved
accusations of rape
50
by government soldiers will highlight some of the troublesome issues.1
A.

The FederalRefugee Office Hearing

Most asylum-seekers who actually enter Germany do so by crossing the border
clandestinely, thus escaping immediate deportation on safe third country grounds. When
they request asylum, they enter the standard asylum procedure. The system first distributes
asylum-seekers among the states in Germany according to a statutory formula,' 5' and
transports them to one of the initial reception centers located in each state. Asylum-seekers
have no say in their assigned location. Asylum-seekers with relatives residing in Germany
are directed to reception centers based on a centralized database concerning available beds,
irrespective of the location of their relatives. Similarly, asylum-seekers who may have
resided in Germany
in the past are assigned to states without consideration of their place of
52
former residence.1
1.

Insufficient Preparation Time

Once the asylum-seekers arrive at their initial reception center, they promptly have an
asylum hearing before the Federal Refugee Office, the agency that decides which asylumseekers are entitled to protection under German law. The Federal Refugee Office has
branch outposts at each of the initial reception centers. The 5branches
typically schedule
3
asylum hearings within four days of the asylum-seekers' arrival.1
Scheduling the major assessment of the asylum claim in such a short time makes it
practically impossible for asylum-seekers to seek counsel or to prepare themselves mentally
148. See Inventory on ReadmissionAgreenens, supranote 92, at 9 (citing to government answers provided
on Aug. 22, 1997 in response to .wittenparliamentary questions).
149. Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
150. I have combined here for purposes of illustration the personal details that two separate women %%hohad
filed asylum claims confided in me.
151. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 45, v. 27.07.93 (BGBI.I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedurel. The p-rcentages
for each state, decided according to population, geographical size, resources, and so on, vary significantly:
Baden-Wiirttemberg 12.2%, Bavaria 14%, Berlin 2.2%, Brandenburg 3.5%, Bremen 1%, Hamburg 2.6%, Hesse

7.4%, Meckleberg-Westem Pomerania 2.7%, Lower Saxony 9.3%, North-RhineVestphalia 22A%, RhinelandPalatinate 4.7%, Saarland 1.4%, Saxony 6.5%, Saxony-Anhalt 4%,. Schleswig-Holstein 2.8%, Thuringia 33%.
Id.
152.
153.

See id.
Interview with Supervisor Frau Krug Ritter, supra note 117.
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and physically for their hearings. Preparation is crucial because the hearing is the only
opportunity for asylum-seekers to describe the basis of their claim. Asylum-seekers can, in
theory, present additional testimony at a subsequent judicial hearing, but contradictions or
inconsistencies will reflect badly on the asylum-seeker's credibility, a factor that is crucial in
asylum cases.' 54

The quick pace of the asylum procedure makes it difficult to obtain on such short
notice medical testimony concerning evidence of past persecution or torture. The
Congolese asylum-seeker mentioned earlier might have relevant hospital records in
Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is unlikely, though, that she could
obtain either hospital or police reports within a few days. 55 In addition to the difficulties of
obtaining corroboration, the swift pace has a particularly negative impact on victims of rape
or torture; many find it impossible to discuss56 their harrowing experiences so soon, before
psychological rehabilitation has taken place.1
Although asylum claims should be decided expeditiously, the German system proceeds
so quickly that evidentiary support for the asylum claim may not be developed. This throws
into question the adequacy of the decisions reached concerning asylum. The more
inadequate the fact-finding, the more likely that some refugees will not be recognized and
granted protection in Germany. Their deportation will violate international law.
2.

Inadequate Interpreters

Scheduling hearings on such short notice also has a negative impact on obtaining
competent legal counseling and qualified interpreters. The law provides that interpreters
shall be provided by the government when needed; asylum-seekers may select interpreters
of their own choice so long as they bear the expense. 157 The law also provides that the
asylum-seeker's legal representative may appear, as well as a representative from the
UNHCR, and others permitted by the Federal Refugee Office. 58 In practice, only three
people are present at most asylum hearings: the hearing officer, the interpreter, and the
asylum-seeker.1 59 Most of the questions and responses are relayed through the interpreter,
who often becomes a key participant in the hearing. As a consequence, the interpreter's
skill is crucial.
Questions have been raised about the qualifications and competence of the
interpreters. Many asylum-seekers bring their own interpreter to the hearing; these
interpreters most frequently are other asylum-seekers who happen to live in the reception
center. Our Congolese asylum-seeker might or might not speak French in addition to her
native Lingala (one of the more than 400 Sudanese and Bantu languages spoken in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo). If she does, it is likely that she might appear for her
154. While a reasonable explanation for inconsistencies might be that the asylum-seeker did not have the
opportunity to obtain legal assistance before the initial hearing and did have the opportunity to do so before the
court hearing, many judges have been skeptical of this explanation.
155. Indeed, the difficulties the Algerian torture victim faced in obtaining timely corroborating evidence in
the accelerated airport procedure would also have occurred in the standard asylum process. See supra text
accompanying note 129.
156. For a discussion of the lengthy process necessary for many female torture victims to come to terms with
their traumatic experiences and the need to allow them to provide details later in the asylum process, see
PSYCHOSOZIALES ZENTRUM, TRAUMA BILDER [PSYCHOSOCIAL CENTER, IMAGES OF TRAUMA] 10-15, 20-25, 30-

31(1997).
157. Asylverfahrensgesetz § 17, v. 27.07.93 (BGBI.I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
158. See id.§ 25(6).
159. See Interview with Supervisor Frau Krug Ritter, supra note 117; author's
Ntimberg/Zimdorf, June 18, 1996.

observations,
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hearing with a French speaker as her interpreter, because Lingala is not commonly spoken
among asylum-seekers in Germany. The degree to which her French dialect might diverge
from that of an asylum-seeker from a different country could be substantial.
The Federal Refugee Office obtains interpreters if the asylum-seeker does not provide
one. Arranging for competent interpreters in many different languages is a difficult task and
is exacerbated by the speedy schedule. The asylum-seekers' ability to assess the
competence of their interpreters, whether selected by the asylum-seekers themselves or by
the Federal Refugee Office, is questionable. Lack of competent interpreters substantially
undermines the ability of the asylum-seekers to set forth a compelling account of the
circumstances that impelled them to flee to Germany.
The speed with which the hearings are scheduled is exceeded only by the speed with
which the decisions are made. In the agency branch office in Nllrnberg, decisions on an
asylum-seeker's application are often reached on the same day as the hearing.1t 9 Written
decisions are generally delivered soon thereafter. The decisions are in German; neither
translations nor interpreters are provided to explain the contents of the decisions. While
asylum-seekers quickly understand the results, they often fail to understand the reasoning
behind the decisions. Their lack of comprehension of the rationales for negative decisions
poses serious impediments to preparing successful appeals. Under international law,
asylum-seekers should receive decisions in writing and in a language they understand. The
failure to provide written decisions
that asylum-seekers can read and understand violates the
61
applicable legal standard.
3.

Insensitivity to Female Asylum-seekers

Language barriers are not the only substantial obstacle to asylum-seekers being able to
convey accurately and fully their claims. The hearings often pose special difficulties for
female asylum-seekers when the hearing officer is a man. Cultural traditions that
circumscribe meetings and conversations that women may have with men who are not
members of the women's families can be a serious impediment1 62 These problems are, of
course, compounded when the fear of persecution involves rape or sexual abuse. It is
notoriously difficult for women from many cultures to discuss with men incidents of sexual
assault, a common persecution tactic, as the wars in the Balkans and elsewhere have
demonstrated1 63

160. The formal processing, printing, and delivery of the decisions to the asylum-sekers typically occurs
within two weeks of the hearing. Interview with Frau Krug Ritter, supra note 117.
161. For example, the European Human Rights Convention requires that those charged with an offense

(such as entering German without the legal right to do so) be informed promptly of the charge against them in a

language that they understand. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 45, art.
5. Decisions that may
result in expulsion of asylum-seekers to lands where they face the risk of persecution implicate rights as serious as
those raised by accusations of a criminal offense. Moreover, the European Human Rights Convention also

requires that state parties provide an effective remedy before a national authority to those whose rights are
violated, and that the rights and freedoms set forth inthe Convention be secured without discrimination based on
language. Id. art. 13. Delivering decisions in languages they cannot understand deprives asylum-seckers of the

ability to seek an effective remedy and may, in itself, constitute discrimination based on language.
162. See Interview with Helmut Frenz, Refugee Advocate, in Hamburg (June 21, 1996).

163. The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recently concluded
criminal proceedings involving sexual violence, sexual enslavement, rape, and torture of women in Bosnia, vwhich
led to the convicytion of three military and paramilitary commanders accused of using sexual assualts as a tactic
in the warfare in Bosnia. Marlise Simons, Three Serbs Convictedin MartimesRapes, N.Y. ThIES, Feb. 23, 2001,

atAl.
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There is no uniform practice conceming Federal Refugee Office hearings of female
asylum-seekers. At least one branch office has indicated that it tries to provide a female
decision maker when a female asylum-seeker requests one. This office does not routinely
inquire whether a woman applicant would prefef to describe her case to a female decisionmaker; only those women assertive enough to make a special request will benefit from the

office's sensitivity to women asylum-seekers. Many women may be very uncomfortable in
a hearing conducted by a man, but too overwhelmed and intimidated by the process to ask
for a female interviewer. Sporadic, well-meaning gestures, such as allowing husbands to
accompany
their wives to hearings, have sometimes inadvertently made the situation
164
worse.
The UNHCR has had long experience with female refugees and asylum-seekers and
has observed some of the special difficulties that they face. Reflecting this experience,
UNHCR has written guidelines for decision makers assigned to interview refugee women
and asylum-seekers who request protection.
Women face special problems in making their case to the authorities, particularly
when they have had experiences which are difficult and painful to describe.
Persecution of women often takes the form of sexual assault ....
The female victim of such sexual torture obviously may be reluctant or find it
very difficult to speak about it, particularly to a male interviewer. Rape, even in
the context of torture, is seen in some cultures as a failure on the part of the
woman to preserve her virginity or marital dignity. She may be shunned by her
family and isolated from other members of the community. Discussing her
experience becomes a further source of alienation.165
Sometimes, women who arrive as part of a family unit are not interviewed or are
cursorily interviewed about their experiences, even when it is possible that they, rather than
their husband, have been the targets of persecution. Their male relatives may not raise
the
166
relevant issues because they are unaware of the details or are ashamed to report them.
Many of the concerns raised by the UNHCR guidelines concerning refugee women
appear to be exacerbated by the German asylum procedure. The dizzying pace of the
Federal Refugee Office hearings and decisions as well as the unevenness of the interpreters

164. This is one powerful example of the unintended consequences of attempts to assist women asylumseekers when the hearing officers are men. Interview with Helmut Frenz, supra note 162.
165.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,

GUIDELINES ON

PROTECTION OF REFUGEE WOIMEN para. 58-60, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (1991),
http://vwwv.unhrc.ch/refword/refworld/legal/refpoY(womguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2001).
166.

I1

avallabhe at

Id. para. 57. Additional portions of the Guidelines are also relevant to the German asylum procedure.

A second problem arises when women are interviewed about the claims to refugee status made by
male relatives. A wife may be interviewed primarily to corroborate the stories told by her husband; if
she is unaware of the details of her husband's experiences (for example, the number of her husband's
military unit), the entire testimony may be discounted as lacking in credibility. Yet, in many cultures,
husbands do not share many details about military or political activities with their wives,
A further legal problem affecting refugee women is the actual status they are granted by a country of
asylum ....
[Al number of countries grant family members a residency status that provides less
protection against deportation than does refugee status. Should the family break up, the wife (who is
more often the person to be joining the one granted refugee status) may find herself without any
protection from forced return. Yet, her own claim to refugee status may be as strong as her husband's
[but due to] lapse in time since the events... [she may] be unable to make the case convincingly for
being granted her own refugee status.
Id. paras 61-62.
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pressed into service likely compound the cultural dislocation experienced by many women
who have suffered persecution in other parts of the world when they try to obtain asylum in
Germany. The lack of support necessary to transcend logistical, language, and other

cultural barriers is a problem for refugee women in particular. These types of problems
undermine the reliability of the decisions reached by the government refugee officials.
B.

JudicialReview

The German asylum procedure provides for judicial review of both positive and
negative decisions. Negative decisions on asylum are accompanied by orders to leave

Germany within one month.

67

They are also accompanied by notices that the rejected

asylum-seekers have two weeks in which to seek judicial review.

6s

All those denied

t 69
asylum-roughly ninety-five percent-have the right to challenge the decision in court.

The Administrative Court reviews both the law and the facts. Appeals from the

Administrative Court to the Administrative Court of Appeals are permitted only if the
challenge raises fundamental questions of law, the appeal specifies serious procedural
errors, or the first judicial
decision is in conflict with the jurisprudence of the Administrative
170
Court of Appeals.

Ironically, the ability to seek correction of errors by the Federal Refugee Office
furnishes the government with another tool to restrict the grant of asylum. The asylum law

permits a government official, the Federal Commissioner for Asylum Affairs, to appeal
Federal Refugee Office decisions granting asylum.' 7 ' The Commissioner does so frequently
and is quite successful. For example, the Federal Refugee Office granted asylum or lesser

forms of protection to approximately 21,000 asylum-seekers in 1997. The Federal
Commissioner for Asylum Affairs challenged close to 4000 of those decisions in court and
prevailed in roughly seventy percent of the challenges.7' Recent proposals to amend the
regulation to permit the Federal Commissioner to challenge negative decisions by the

167. See Asylverfhhrensgesetz § 38(1), v. 27.07.93 (BGB1. I S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
168. See id.§ 74(1) (filing a notice of appeal with the Administrative Court automatically stays deportation),
§74(2) (applicants have one month from the service of the decision to submit the grounds for the appeal). See
also Interview with Frau Krug Ritter, supra note 117 (courts may allow details added later).
169. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. The Federal Refugee Office recognized less than 3% of
the applications as refugees in 2000, down from 3% in 1999, 3.9% in 1998, and 4.9% in 1997, and markedly
lower than the 7A% in 1996. See Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4. Some of the 95% denied
refugee status are granted lesser forms of protection as indicated in the text accompanying notes 184-197.
170. The same limitations apply to appeals from the Administrative Court of Appeals to the Federal
Administrative Court. After exhausting all available remedies, cases that raise a constitutional claim may be
appealed from the Federal Administrative Court to the Federal Constitutional Court. Asylverfashrensgesetz §
78(3).
171. Id.§6.
172. See Letter from the Office of the Federal Commissioner of Asylum Affairs to Frau Dahning (Aug. 19,
1998) (stating that in 1997 the Federal Refugee Office recognized 8,443 applicants as refugees and granted
12,547 applicants protection pursuant to §§ 51 or 53 of the Aliens Law. The Federal Commissioner filed judicial
challenges in 3,772 of these cases. Official statistics on the success rate of the Federal Commissioner's court
petitions were not available, but spot checks by the Federal Commissioner's Office indicated that petitions wee
approved and protection accordingly refused to asylum-seekers in approximately seventy percent of the cases.
The statistics for the first six months of 1998 included 3248 recognized as refugees, 4509 granted protection
pursuant to §§ 51 and 53 of the Aliens Law, and 1583 challenges filed by the Federal Commissioner ofAs)lum
Affairs).
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Federal Refugee
Office have been opposed by the Federal Refugee Office. They have not
1 73
been enacted.
There is no doubt that Germany has devoted significant resources to creating and
staffing an elaborate asylum procedure that includes a possibility of judicial review.
Nonetheless, three features of the system-the speed with which the initial decisions are
made, the lack of reliable interpreters, and the lack of state-subsidized legal counselcombine to cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the decisions and on the likelihood that the
courts will provide significant oversight of most of the agency's decisions. Moreover, the
language barriers are often only one aspect of more profound cultural differences, such as
the inhibitions on conversations between unrelated men and women, which raise further
questions about the ability of the Federal Refugee Office's asylum procedures to recognize
adequately which applicants are fleeing persecution. In addition, the failure to provide the
agency decisions in languages the asylum-seekers understand seriously undercuts their
ability to seek effective corrective measures via judicial review.
Germany faces many cases in which individuals who do not satisfy the legal
requirements apply for asylum. The skepticism this produces seems to create a negative
presumption in practice, though not in theory. When added to the flaws described earlier,
this leads to overwhelming numbers of negative decisions. Many refusals to provide
protection may be warranted. The risks to those asylum-seekers who receive an
unwarranted rejection of their asylum claim is so great, however, that it raises concern.
Germany's international law obligation to refrain from returning a refugee to persecution is

compromised by the combined weaknesses in the system.
IX.
A.

CRITERIA FOR ASYLUM

ConstitutionalGuaranteeof Asylum

In addition to restricting access to Germany and access to the basic asylum procedure,
Germany applies very restrictive substantive law to the relatively few asylum-seekers who
manage to enter the procedure. These restrictive interpretations run counter to the purpose
behind international refugee law and disqualify many asylum-seekers who fear stark
persecution.
1.

State-sponsored Persecution

The German courts have generally required that all asylum-seekers demonstrate that
they fear persecution by the state.1 74 On its face, this requirement seems reasonable, even
unexceptional. In practice, it means that persecution by powerful insurrectionary groups has
been disregarded if state authority still exists. If the Algerian asylum-seeker had been
tortured in Algeria not by the military, but by the Armed Islamic Group because he is a
Christian, it is unlikely he would have been granted asylum in Germany so long as the
government controlled a portion of Algeria. Even if the government had effectively ceded
173. See CriticismsAgainst the Role of the FederalCommissionerfor Asylum Matters Who Appeals Only
Against Positive Decisions, MIGRATION NEWs SHEET, Mar. 2000, at 11. The Deputy Director of the Federal
Refugee Office has opposed this proposal on the grounds that rejected asylum-seekers may appeal on their own
behalf. Id. Calls for the Federal Commissioner to seek judicial review of the decisions denying asylum as well as
decisions granting asylum continue to be hotly debated. Is the Claim of Germany's LiberalAsylum Law Merely a
Myth?, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Dec. 2000, at 14.
174. See, e.g., BVerwGE 104,254.
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control of the region where the asylum-seeker lived to the Armed Islamic Group, the
asylum-seeker would have been ineligible for asylum.

This is a narrow approach in the face of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defines
refugees as those who have a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or social group. 175 It conflicted simultaneously with the
European Human Rights Convention's prohibition against sending individuals to countries

where they will face torture or inhuman or degrading treatmenLt 76 It ignored the reality that
internal armed conflict within a state has been a major source of persecution and human
rights violations in the last decades of the twentieth century. As current news reports from
Sierra Leone have continued to depict ferocious and mutilating persecution inflicted by
rebel forces who control substantial portions of the country'7, it has been worse than ironic
that persecution by non-state actors has been excluded from the types of persecution that
entitle victims to asylum in Germany.
Recently, the German Constitutional Court indicated that this interpretation has been
too narrov. 178 The Constitutional Court instructed lower courts to give more weight to the
acts that constitute the persecution and to focus less on the nature of the agent of
persecution. It concluded that in some circumstances, a non-state actor could engage in
political persecution if it effectively controlled a significant portion of territory. Although
the Constitutional Court did not rule that the Afgahani asylum-seekers before it have
established political persecution, instead remanding the case to the lower courts to define
those circumstances that give rise to political persecution, this ruling may affect many
Afghani, 179
Somali, and Sri Lankan asylum-seekers whose asylum claims have been previously
rejected.

Regrettably, the Constitutional Court affirmed the earlier judicial ruling that those
fleeing persecution by one of several rival groups, none of which controls the country, are
not entitled to asylum under German law. 5 0 In essence, Germany denies asylum to those
who flee persecution if there is too much of it! No matter how credible the reports of
persecution, if there are multiple sources of persecution and the situation is too anarchic,
German courts will conclude that state authority has18 disintegrated and that, as a
consequence, the asylum-seekers are ineligible for asylum. '
This interpretation is unnecessarily restrictive. It has been criticized by the UNHCR
and other refugee advocates as an incorrect interpretation of the 1951 Refugee
Convention. 8 2 It defies reason to deny asylum to those wvho face persecution because they
oppose the political stance of one or more warring groups that has not yet consolidated

control over substantial portions of the territory. It violates international law to turn these
asylum-seekers back to face threats to their life and liberty.
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
176. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Barbara Crossette, Zambian Criticizes Leadership of Sierra Leone Peacekeepers,N.Y.
TIiES, May 7, 2000, at Al 6.; Norimitsu Onishi, Fighting Resumes Aear the CapitalofSierraLcone, N.Y. T".IES,
May 8, 2000, at Al; Norimitsu Onishi, Guinea in Crisis asArca'sRefugces PourIn, N.Y. TwIEs, Feb. 24, 2001,
at Al.
178. People Fleeing Persecution in Civil War Situations are Also Entitlcd to the ConstitutionalRight of
Asylum, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Sept. 2000, at 11 (citing the Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BVcrfGE 260, 2
BVerfGE 1353).
179. Id.
180. BVerw6GE 105,322.
181. People Fleeing Persecution in Civil War Situations are Also Entitlcd to the ConstitutionalRight of
Asylum, supranote 178.
182. See, ag., Van Hear & Crisp,supra note 3, at 6.
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Internal Flight Alternative

German asylum law includes another unwarranted restrictive notion, the "internal
flight alternative," which disqualifies asylum-seekers from protection in Germany if there is
a safe area in their homeland to which they might have fled. On the surface, again, it may
appear eminently reasonable to suggest that asylum-seekers first attempt to find a safe haven
in their homeland before they flee to another country. The reality, though, is that many
times it is more difficult to reach a safe area in the same country than it is to leave the
country altogether. In other situations asylum-seekers might be able to reach safe regions in
their homeland but are unable to speak the predominant language. In some circumstances,
asylum-seekers can speak the language but find it impossible to obtain work in the safe area;
without family or other support networks, life becomes impossible. In these and other
situations, the practical need to survive contradicts the theoretical availability of internal
flight alternatives. These legalistic approaches
to the refugee definition thwart the very
83
purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention.1
B.

Statutory ProtectionAgainst Persecution

1.

"Lesser" Asylum

Implicitly acknowledging the unacceptability of denying asylum to those who face
persecution but do not meet the narrow standards enunciated by the courts, German law
provides several avenues of lesser protection. Section 51 of the Aliens Law forbids
deportation to states where asylum-seekers' lives or freedom would be threatened on
account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group. 184 Colloquially known as "lesser asylum," this legal provision prevents
refoulement but does not provide the asylum-seeker with refugee status.
In practice, it provides a degree of protection, less than that accorded to those granted
asylum, to two groups of asylum-seekers. It protects those who prove they fear persecution
from groups acting without state authority. For example, the Algerian fearing persecution
from the Armed Islamic Group on account of his political opinion would be eligible for
"lesser asylum." Similarly, before the Taliban consolidated its control over vast portions of
Afghanistan, an Afghani who feared persecution in a land where no state authority existed
would have been eligible for "lesser asylum."
"Lesser asylum" also protects asylum-seekers who satisfy German authorities that they
have a well-founded fear of persecution, but no longer have evidence of their particular
travel route. German authorities presume these asylum-seekers came by land, passed
through a safe third country, and consequently are ineligible for asylum. 85 German officials
cannot send asylum-seekers back to unidentified safe third countries, however, so they stay
in Germany, but without refugee status.
The former Soviet military officer with a well-founded fear of persecution in Armenia
would at most be eligible for "lesser asylum" if she had no travel documents or other
183. Relying on this restrictive definition of persecution, the Federal Refugee Office granted asylum under
the German Constitution and the 1951 Refugee Convention in less than 3% of the asylum cases decided in 2000.
Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
184. Ausltindergesetz § 51, v. 9.7.1990 (BGB1. I S.1354, 1356), zuletzt geandert durch Art. 3 Geetz, v,
15.07.93 (BGB1. H S.1010) [Aliens Law of July 9, 1990 as amended].
185. Essentially, the only asylum-seekers exempt from this presumption are those with proof they entered by
air or sea without crossing a safe third country. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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evidence of her route to Germany. The Congolese asylum-seeker and rape victim who
entered Germany without travel documents would be in the same situation. Despite
undisputed claims of persecution by government authorities, they would not be eligible for
asylum in Germany and would not be guaranteed the protections afforded refugees under the
1951 Refugee Convention. They would instead be granted renewable two-year residence
permits and work permits.
The Federal Refugee Office granted "lesser asylum" in 5.73% of the cases it decided
in 1997. i1 6 In 1998, only 3.69% of the applicants received "lesser asylum," but the number
of cases awarding "lesser asylum" increased to 4.54% in 1999 and to 7.88% in 2000.1s7
"Lesser asylum" offers asylum-seekers a measure of protection from persecution. It is a
mechanism by which Germany can comply with its non-refoulement obligation. At the
same time, it is a mechanism by which Germany avoids affording refugees all the rights that
the 1951 Refugee Convention mandates for recognized refugees. Since all those granted
"lesser asylum" must demonstrate the well-founded fear of persecution required by the
Convention, they should be accorded the benefits of its terms. Only the restrictive German
interpretations of state persecution and the safe third country rule prevent those in "lesser
asylum" status from the flil protection of international law.
2.

Prohibition Against Deportation

Those denied asylum and denied "lesser asylum" may apply for a less desirable status
under Section 53 of the Aliens Law.l ss If deportation would subject them to torture, t8 lead
to serious threats to physical safety, life, or liberty, 19 or otherwise violate the European
Convention on Human Rights, 191 they may qualify for yet another form of protection against

refoulement. They may fall into the category known as "prohibition of deportation:' Those
who satisfy the criteria for this protection, nevertheless, receive official deportation orders.
Although deportation to their homeland is prohibited, Germany can theoretically deport
them to any other country. As a practical matter, no other country will admit them, so the

deportation order will not be enforced.
If the Congolese asylum-seeker mentioned earlier were denied "lesser asylum"
because she presented insufficient proof that she would be singled out for persecution in the
future, she might still seek an order prohibiting her deportation to the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. If the German authorities concluded that the violence in her homeland is so
widespread that she would face serious threats to her physical safety there, they might order
this lesser degree of protection.
The German authorities typically grant asylum-seekers whose deportation is prohibited
"tolerated" residence permits, known as Duldttng. These permits allow them to stay in
Germany for up to six months. At the end of the term, government officials may extend the
permits for another short period if the conditions in the homeland have not changed. The
Federal Refugee Office granted protection under this provision in 1.6% of the decisions in

186. Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supranote 4.
187. Id.
188. Titled Abscheibungshindernisse [Obstacles to Deportation], § 53 of the Aliens Law is often refered to
as "C Status". This is in contrast to § 51, which is knownm as "B Status" and Article 16a of the Constitution,
which provides the greatest protection or"A Status." Auslindergesetz §§ 53, 51.
189. Id. § 53(l).

190. Id. §53(6).
191. Id. §53(4).

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36:231

1997 and 1.7% of the decisions1in
1998. The numbers dropped further in 1999 and 2000 to
92
1.55% and 1.51%, respectively.
Rejected Asylum-seekers Who Cannot Be Deported

3.

Many asylum-seekers denied asylum, "lesser asylum," and protection from deportation
under Section 53 of the Aliens Law nonetheless remain in Germany because there is no
practical way to deport them. For example, over 100,000 Albanians from the province of
Kosovo in Yugoslavia sought asylum in Germany in the early 1990s.193 Most had applied
for asylum and had been rejected. Until 1996 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to
take them back, so they remained in Germany. In late 1996 Yugoslavia agreed to readmit
Yugoslav citizens according to detailed procedures. 94 The repatriation moved very slowly
and then stopped in the summer of 1998 due to the flight ban imposed by the EU on the
Yugoslav national airline in response to violence in Kosovo. 195 The Kosovar Albanians
remained in Germany.
This situation is not unique to Kosovar Albanians. Smaller numbers of asyltum-seekers
from other countries are in the same situation. The mayor of Hamburg, for example, has
complained
about the inability to return approximately 3,000 foreigners to various African
6
19

nations.

These rejected asylum-seekers who cannot be repatriated remain in Germany. They
residence permits, or Duldung, which need to be renewed
generally receive "tolerated"
97
every few months.1

192. Federal Refugee Office Statistics, supra note 4.
193. News reports in the mid-1990s stated that there were 135,000 deportable Yugoslav citizens in
Germany. Roughly 120,000 were rejected asylum-seekers, and most of these were Kosovar Albanians. See
Readmission Accord with Belgrade, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Nov. 1996, at 9 (citing SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNO,
Oct. 15, 1996).
194. Germany and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed a readmission agreement on October 10, 1996.
The readmission agreement specifies that deportations to Yugoslavia must be carried out by the Yugoslav national
airline. See A Human Rights Crisis in Kosovo Province, The Protection of Kosovo's Displaced and Refugees, at
http://www.amnesty.org/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2001).
195. As the crisis in Kosovo continued to worsen in the spring and summer of 1998, with no efforts by
Milosevic to curb increasing atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, the EU imposed a ban on flights between the
territory of all EU members states and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Council Regulation 2151/1999, 1999
O.J. (1 264) 3. In light of the Sept. 24, 2000 election of a new president of Yugoslavia and additional actions
toward increasing democratic government, this flight ban was repealed on Oct. 9,2000 by EC Council Regulation
No. 2227/2000. Council Regulation 2227/2000,2000 O.J. (L 255) 2.
196. See HamburgAlso Wants Quicker Expulsion of Foreigners,MIGRATION NEWs SHEET, Sept. 1997, at
3-4 (citing SODDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 28, 1997).

197. The wars in the Balkans have created additional groups of temporarily protected persons in Germany.
Section 54 of the Aliens Law provides that state authorities can delay the deportation of designated groups of
foreigners for periods up to six months. This short-term protection is not limited to war-like situations, and can
encompass humanitarian grounds. See Auslindergesetz § 54, v. 9.7.1990 (BGB1. I S.1354, 1356), zuletzt
geandert durch Art. 3 Gesetz, v. 15.07.93 (BGB1. 11 S.1010) [Aliens Law of July 9, 1990 as amended].
Pursuant to the provision, Germany sheltered roughly 340,000 Bosnians, more than all the rest of western
Europe combined. Viewing Bosnians as civil war refugees, the German Government granted them short-term
permits, extended in six-month increments. Since the Dayton Accords were signed in late 1995, there has been
great pressure on Bosnians to leave Germany and return to Bosnia. By the end of 1998, approximately 250,000
Bosnians had gone back to Bosnia. See Westendorp Accused of ConcentratingEfforts in Return of Bosnlans to
Areas Where They Would be in a Minority, MIGRATION NEWs SHEET, Feb. 1999, at 10 (citing SODDEITrsCtHE
ZErrtUNG, Jan. 30, 1999).
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The Duldung Dilemma

The situation of those granted short-term Duldung residence permits-both those
whose outstanding deportation orders cannot be enforced because they would face serious
threats to their life if returned to their homeland, and those whose countries will not readmit
them-is dismal. They are allowed to work, 198 but few employers ,All hire workers with
short-term residence permission and uncertain prospects of extension.'9 Even if an
employer is willing to take a chance, the asylum-seeker can obtain a job permit only if the
job has already been offered to and rejected by German citizens and citizens from the
European Union countries. 200 In practice, these asylum-seekers can remain in Germany for
renewable six-month intervals but cannot obtain legal employment.
Employment obstacles exacerbate a difficult situation. The law permits those granted
protection to move from reception centers for asylum-seekers into private
accommodations. 201 They can rarely do so, however, because they cannot find work that
would allow them to pay the rent. Ironically, the system prevents them from supporting and
housing themselves and their families. The irony is compounded by the fact that there are
category, but they remain idle rather than
trained engineers and other skilled workers in this
22
use their skills to contribute to German society.
The obstacles to becoming self-supporting undercut a central premise of the refugee
system in Germany: the asylum-seekers granted protection are supposed to move from statesupported accommodations into private housing where they can support themselves and live
without social assistance. The inability to obtain legal work turns this seemingly reasonable
requirement into an almost insurmountable barrier.
There is no government support for efforts to integrate this group of asylum-seekers
into the local community. There are no funds for language training and no funds for job
training.2 They wait in limbo.
The short-term permission extended to those protected against deportation renders
them very insecure. Many who qualify for this minimal form of protection face severe
danger at home. In Germany they simultaneously face a major psychological burden,
worrying about imminent deportation, and a difficult financial situation. Prevented from
working and supporting themselves, keeping their skills up-to-date, and carrying out the
routine tasks of living, these asylum-seekers and their families tend to remain in refugee
Mostly, they sit and wait. The
shelters. Many become increasingly dysfunctional .2

temporary nature of the protection contributes to widespread difficulties experienced by this
group. Their stay in Germany is very tenuous and their situation bleak.

198. The de facto ban on employment for asylum-seekers who entered Germany after May 1997 will bh
removed, effective Jan. 2001. Those asylum-seekers whose asylum requests have been pending for one year or
more will be permitted to work. See Employmtent Ban to be PartiallyLifcd, MIGRATION NEMWS S|EET, Nov.
2000, at 11.
199. See Interview with Rudolf Klever, Refugee Advocate and National Coordinator for Gamnany, Europ.an
Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA), in Hamburg (June 22,1996).
200. Karsten Lithke, Asylum in Germany, 57 ZDWF-SCHRIFTENTE EI17 (1994).
201. Asylverfahresgesetz § 53, v.27.07.93 (BGBI.IS.1361) [Lav on Asylum Procedure].

202. See generally interviews with asylum-seekers in Leipzig and with refugee advocates, Refugee
Assistance Group, in Leipzig (June 26, 1996).
203. Id.
204. Interviews with staff members at refugee housing, Wohneontainers, in Leipzig (June 26, 1996).
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DETENTION

Detention of asylum-seekers has become an increasingly common practice in
205
Germany. In general, asylum-seekers are not detained during the asylum procedure.

Once asylum claims are rejected and appeals are exhausted, deportation orders are entered
and asylum-seekers frequently face detention at that point. International legal standards that
mandate separate accommodations for persons not convicted of a crime are often ignored. 6
The requirement that there be "separate treatment appropriate to [the] status of unconvicted
persons' 20 7 is even less evident.
A.

DetentionPendingDeportation

The conditions of detention of asylum-seekers vary considerably from state to state.
Separate detention facilities for foreigners pending deportation exist in only three of the
states.208 In North Rhine-Westphalia, the government has built a large number of detention
facilities which provide the capacity to detain more than 1200 foreigners. 2°9 Not
surprisingly, detention of unsuccessful asylum applicants is common. Similarly, Berlin has
210
constructed a large new detention center that can house close to 400 awaiting deportation.
21
In contrast, Baden-Wtirttemburg maintains a capacity for only 150 deportation detainees. 1
Bavaria, a state generally conservative on social policy issues, has not developed a large
number of detention centers and infrequently detains rejected asylum-seekers.21 2
German law provides few legal protections to those detained pending deportation.
Ironically, German criminal law sets minimum conditions for incarceration of those
convicted of criminal offenses, but these legal provisions do not protect non-criminals in
detention. As a consequence, asylum-seekers accused of no crime can be housed in worse
213
conditions than convicted criminals.
The circumstances of detention vary widely, as do the physical conditions of the
facilities. For example, in Berlin, those under deportation orders are housed in a special
deportation detention center.2 4 In many other states, such as Saxony, those detained
pending deportation are held in separate wings of prisons for people convicted of serious
criminal offenses.21 5 Sometimes, as in Hamburg, the deportation detainees are housed with
217
other prisoners;216 more commonly, they are segregated from convicted criminals.
205. As asylum-seekers enter Germany, they are typically housed at initial reception centers for a short timo
while the original processing takes place. After a few weeks or in some cases a few months, asylum-seekers often
are assigned to smaller housing units set aside for asylum applicants. See supra text accompanying notes 151153, Ltthke, supra note 200, at 7-8. While they live in the initial reception center and in the subsequent
accommodations, they are free to travel within the local area. Id. at 8.
206. ICCPR Article 10(2)(a), supra note 49 and accompanying text.

207. Id. art. 10(2)(a).
208. For details on detention pending deportation in each of the German states, see Hubert Heinhold,
Abschiebungshaft in Deutschland--eine Situationsbeschreibung [Deportation Detention in Germany: A Study]
(Mar. 1997), available at http://www.proasyl.defab-haftO.htm (last visited Mar. 2,2001).
209. Id. at 2.10.
210. Id.at2.3.
211. Id.at2.1.
212. Id. at 2.2.

213. German civil law does not address conditions of incarceration as it does not anticipate that civil
proceedings will result in detention.
214. Interview with Father Bemd Ganter, in Berlin (June 25, 1996).
215. Interview with members of the Deportation Task Force of the Refugee Assistance Group, in Leipzig
(June 26, 1996).

216. Interview with Helmut Frenz, supra note 162.
217. See UNHRC, Detention ofAsylum-Seekers in Europe,4 EUROPEAN SERIES 121, 130-131 (1995).

2001]

GERMANY LEADS EUROPE IN DISMANiTING REFUGEE PROTECnON

271

Most deportation detention occurs in old, overcrowded prisons. In nine of the states,
rejected asylum-seekers and other foreigners held for deportation are locked into ordinary
prison cells and receive the same treatment as convicted criminals. They are rarely allowed
outside to exercise, are restricted to one hour per month for visitors, are limited in receiving
amenities, and their mail is censored.2 18 The poor conditions are compounded by the
language barrier, which often restricts communication among deportation detainees as well
as between
them and the staff. Detention in these circumstances is extremely isolating and
219
bleak.
German law permits detention only in limited circumstances, but legal challenges to
detention are nonetheless rare. A complex legal system, featuring bifurcated legal
proceedings, poses insuperable obstacles for most asylum-seekers. Protests against the
detention must be directed to the ordinary Civil Courts, whereas protests of the decision to
deny asylum must be directed to the Administrative Courts. Efforts to protest the detention
to the Administrative Court reviewing the asylum case meet with total failure. On the other
hand, evidence that the detained asylum-seeker has a right to remain in Germany falls on
deaf ears in Civil Courts reviewing the detention decision.220 This strict division not only
baffles asylum-seekers, it often confuses German lawyers who address their arguments in
asylum cases to the incorrect court'

21

tm
challenges to detention of asylum-seekers.

Accordingly, there are few effective judicial

Furthermore, there are many barriers to seeking judicial review of detention. Those
detained pending deportation are typically asylum-seekers whose applications have been
rejected. They do not understand the German legal system and often they do not even lmow
why they have been imprisoned. Most do not speak German. As rejected asylum-seekers
they do not fall under UNHCR's jurisdiction, so this avenue ofprotection is unavailable.
Access to legal counsel is practically nonexistent. Detained asylum-seekers do not
have the money to obtain legal assistance, nor do they know lawyers who could help them.
There are few German lawyers who are equipped to help asylum-seekers challenge
detentiontm There is no public support for legal services for the poor. As a result, there is
no cadre of lawyers vho have learned the law that is pertinent to indigent asylum-seekers.
The relatively few private lawyers competent to deal with issues of asylum law and
detention focus their practice on other clients because they4 cannot support themselves
adequately by representing indigent detained asylum-seekers. 2
Pro bono efforts to provide assistance to detained asylum-seekers and other migrants
have often been thwarted. In Saxony, those detained pending deportation are incarcerated
in six or seven different prisons located throughout the state. Most of those detained
pending deportation do not understand the legal system and do not speak enough German to
make sense of what has happened to them. Because there are no local lawyers who provide
legal representation to the penniless aliens in prison, members of a local volunteer group
have tried to provide a range of assistance and practical advice to the detainees. In
response, the local prosecutor has accused them of engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law and a judge of the Administrative Court has warned them of the large monetary fines
218.

Heinhold, supra note 208.

219. Interview with Hubert Heinhold, supra note 141; Interview with Rudolph Klever, supranote 199.
220. Challenges concerning the merits of the asylum claim are viewed as challenges to the decisions of an
administrative agency, the Federal Refugee Office, and must be filed in the system of Administrative Courts.
Asylverfahrensgesetz § 74, v. 27.07.93 (BGB.lI S.1361) [Law on Asylum Procedure].
221. Interview with Rudolf Klever, supra note 199.
222. Id
223. Id
224. Interview with Hubert Heinhold, supra note 141.
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that can be imposed for such a violation.'
These accusations have intimidated the
volunteers.
Blocked in their attempt to assist deportation detainees, some of the volunteers in
Saxony seized upon another approach. They have tried to furnish practical help by utilizing
a provision in German law that recognizes a quasi-guardian status known as a "person in
trust.''226 Under this provision prisoners in deportation detention have designated certain
volunteers as their "person in trust." The designated volunteers have made telephone calls
and taken certain other actions on behalf of the detainees. When the volunteer "persons in
trust" sought to review the court files in order to inform the detainees of the contents of their
files, which would enable the detainees to decide whether to formulate legal challenges, the
court refused all access to the files because the "persons in trust" were not the detainees'
attorneys. As a consequence, those in deportation detention could not learn the contents of
their own court files. The volunteers assisting those in detention were first threatened for
acting like lawyers and then berated for not being lawyers. There was no one else to help
the detainees.
Another example of significant restrictions on access to counseling for those in
deportation detention can be seen in Berlin where Father Bemd GiInter is a chaplain at the
detention center for those awaiting deportation. Extremely knowledgeable about asylum
law and about the Aliens Law in Germany, GiInter provides spiritual counsel and practical
advice to those imprisoned in the detention center. The prison authorities circumscribe
Giinter's work by allowing him to speak only to those detainees who specifically request a
meeting with him in the chaplain's office. They do not allow him to visit the detainees in
227
their living areas, nor to speak spontaneously to detainees who have not asked to see him.
As a result, many inmates who might find it useful to speak to him do not know he exists.
The prison grapevine that might ordinarily rectify this situation is less likely to be effective
in a deportation detention center where the inmates speak many different languages and
often cannot understand their fellow inmates very well.
The Armenian woman who sought asylum in Germany based on her persecution as a
former member of the Soviet military conveys some sense of the isolation and hardship that
foreigners face in detention. 22 While her application was still pending, she had been
returned to Poland. She slipped back into Germany and went to the police to tell them she
229
belonged in the asylum center.
They took me to the police station and kept me there all day and night. I slept on
a hard bench. The next day they took me to court. There was an interpreter who
spoke broken Russian. I never got a lawyer. The court sentenced me to eighteen
weeks in prison for illegally entering Germany.
I was immediately taken to a prison in Dresden, where I arrived late in the
evening of January 7. I asked for food and water, but they told me it was too late
225. Interview with members of the Deportation Task Force of the Refugee Assistance Group, supra note
215.
226. The individual designated a "person in trust" does not have the powers of a legal guardian, but can take
certain actions on behalf of another. § 80 BGB (BORGERLICHES GEzETzBucH) [CIvIL CODE].
227. Interview with Father Bernd Ganter, supra note 214.
228. The detention of this asylum-seeker occurred in unusual circumstances. In contrast to the typical

scenario in which asylum-seekers are detained, she was neither detained pending deportation nor detained atthe
airport. She was incorrectly sent to Poland during her asylum process and detained as an illegal alien when site
crossed back into Germany to press her asylum claim. While the circumstances of detention are atypical, the
sense of isolation and hardship she experienced as a non-German speaker in detention echo the descriptions
offered by many other detained asylum-seekers.
229. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 90-91.
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in the evening. The next day I got my first meal in forty-eight hours. I was put
in solitary confinement. I asked for an attorney, but was told it was impossible to
get one if I could not pay. In protest, I started a hunger strike.
I started bleeding. I asked for a doctor but there never was one. I was sick and
my cell smelled of garbage. I wanted to kill myself. The only thing that kept me
alive was another prisoner I never saw. Once or twice a day I could hear him
singing in Russian. Somehow that made me feel like living. After six days I w-as
moved to a cell with five other women. After twenty days of bleeding, a doctor
finally came and gave me medicine, but it did not help. They took me in
handcuffs to the city hospital where a gynecologist treated me and I got better.
After two months in prison in Dresden, I was transferred to another prison where
the conditions were better. Books and radios were permitted. Writing paper was
provided. Clergy visited the prisoners. I kept requesting a lawyer, but to no
avail. Finally, on May 10, 1994, I was released from prison and sent back to the
asylum center outside Stemberg. 230
Technically, this asylum-seeker may have been, in terms of the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, a convicted person. That conclusion is debatable, as she
"illegally" re-entered Germany only after she had been erroneously expelled before
receiving a decision on her claim. Her particular status is irrelevant, however, to the larger
point. Many rejected asylum-seekers are detained in facilities that mainly house individuals
who have been convicted of crimes. Some are housed in prison vings separate from
criminals; others are not. Almost all the detained asylum-seekers appear to live under the
same penal conditions as those convicted of crimes. Those detained pending deportation
have not been convicted of crimes. International law requires they receive treatment
appropriate to their unconvicted status. The German detention system does not provide

appropriate treatment. The growing use of detention pending the deportation of rejected
asylum-seekers, particularly the practice of housing them in prisons holding convicted
criminals, is a growing violation of international law.
B.

Detention at the Airport

In contrast to the general practice, almost all asylum-seekers who arrive at the
international airports in Germany face immediate detention in locked facilities. They are
detained prior to a decision on the merits of their asylum claim, before they have been
ordered deported. During this period they are held in several spartan rooms, with very

limited opportunity for fresh air or exercise.
The accelerated airport procedure aims to expel unsuccessful asylum-seekers from
Germany within a matter of days; the anticipated length of the entire procedure is less than
three weeks. On numerous occasions, though, asylum-seekers remain in the locked airport

facility for an extended time. In 1996, approximately 200 asylum-seekers, including twenty
children, were detained more than three weeks at the airports"3 In 1997, 322 individuals,

230. Interview with asylum-seeker, supranote 60.
231. Letter from Kirchliche Dienste am Flughafen [Airport Ecclesiastical Services] to Beamd Memovic, Pro
Asyl (Aug. 21, 1998) (on file with the Texas International Law Journal); Accelcratcd "Airport Procedure",
MIGRATIONNEWS SHEET, Sept. 9, at 9.
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including fifty-three children, spent twenty or more days in airport detention. 232 In the first
half of 1998, 210 asylum-seekers were detained at the airport for lengthy periods. 233 At
least one individual, the Algerian torture victim, was held at Frankfurt/Main airport for more
than a year during protracted legal proceedings.
More frequently, extended detention at the airport occurs after a final negative
decision has been issued and is caused by consular delays in the issuance of travel
documents to asylum-seekers rejected by the German government. Asylum-seekers can be
confined to the locked areas at the airport for many months pending deportation while
consular officers investigate whether the rejected asylum-seekers are nationals of their
country. The consular investigations can be slow and the obligatory travel documents may
never be finalized. 234 Sometimes no country will acknowledge the rejected asylum-seeker
as its national. 235 Denied admission to Germany and denied re-entry to their homelands,
these asylum-seekers remain locked in detention at the airport. Only after eighteen months
of detention must they be released. 2 6 These individuals, though rejected as refugees by
Germany, have not been convicted of a crime. International law obliges Germany to treat
them in accordance with their status as unconvicted persons. Detaining them when there is
no hope of deporting them and no finding that they pose a danger is unlawful.

XI.

CONCLUSION

Germany amended its Constitution in 1993 to restrict the legal standards concerning
asylum-seekers. Subsequent legislation and judicial rulings have also developed in a
restrictive direction. Germany has limited access to its territory and access to its asylum
process to such an extent that many who have a bona fide fear of persecution never have
their asylum claims examined on the merits in Germany or in any other country they later
reach. Those who do enter the asylum procedure face negative presumptions and an ever
more restrictive jurisprudence regarding Germany's obligations under the 1951 Refugee
Convention, the European Human Rights Convention, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and German law.
As the level of protection falls lower and lower, the refugees and asylum-seekers
become more vulnerable and exploited. Those allowed to stay, but restricted to short-term
residence permits, become more dysfunctional while they remain in Germany and more
likely to face difficulties when they return home. Growing numbers spend substantial
periods confined in prisons. Those in detention rarely have an opportunity to challenge
procedural or substantive errors in the decisions on their claims.
232.

Letter from Kirchliche Dienste am Flughafen [Airport Ecclesiastical Services] to Bemd Mesovic, Pro

Asyl, supra note 231.
233. Id.
234. Interview with Frau Richter-Kog, supra note 140.

235. There have been reports that certain African states that depend on development aid from Germany tend
to accept asylum-seekers whose nationality has been denied by other consulates in Germany. German officials
have threatened to terminate development aid to countries that refuse to readmit their nationals. No Development
Aid for Countries Refusing to Take Back Their Nationals, MIGRATION NEWS SIIEET, June 1998, at 5 (citing

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, May 19, 1998).
236. To accomplish deportation, authorities can detain aliens for a term of six months, which can be
extended by a maximum of twelve months, see Ausllndergesetz § 57(3), v. 9.7.1990 (BGB1. I S.1354, 1356),
zuletzt gedndert durch Art. 3 Gesetz, v. 15.07.93 (BGBI. II S.1010) [Aliens Law of July 9, 1990 as amended]. So
long as a country does not directly refuse to readmit the asylum-seekers, the asylum-seekers remain locked in
detention. They wait months and months and sometimes readmission never occurs. If, in contrast, the countries in
question directly refuse to prepare travel documents for these asylum-seekers, the asylum-seekers would have to
be released from detention. If it is impossible to deport them, the legal basis for their detention-to carry out
deportation--ceases to exist and they must be released.
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Germany, which mid-way through the twentieth century saw so many of its citizens

denied refuge in the face of certain doom, has effectively shut its doors to refugees. Other
European nations, now as then, have neglected to devise an equitable system to respond to
those fleeing persecution and war. Instead, EU states watch as Germany refines the safe
third country rule and related concepts that it relies upon to push asylum-seekers back to
countries with shaky economies and undeveloped refugee protection systems. Germany and
others may justify the restrictive German approach to asylum as a self-help measure that
forces other states to share some of the burdens generated by growing numbers of asylumseekers. In reality, the post-1993 German asylum policy is truly a failure of protection in
the name of burden-sharing.
The last decade of the twentieth century saw Germany dismantle much of its generous
post-World War II refugee system. Other EU states have been monitoring the impacts of
the recent restrictions imposed by Germany. If they follow Germany's lead, the institution
of refugee protection in Europe will clearly become inadequate to respond to the twentyfirst century's needs.
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